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 i
Abstract 
 
    Managers in the last two decades have witnessed a period of change unparalleled 
in the history of the world, in terms of advances in technology, globalization of 
markets, and stabilization of political economies. With the increasing number of 
“world-class” competitors both domestically and abroad, organizations have had to 
improve their internal processes rapidly in order to stay competitive. In the 
1960s-1970s, companies began to develop detailed market strategies, which focused 
on creating and capturing customer loyalty. Organizations also realized that strong 
engineering, design, and manufacturing functions were necessary in order to support 
these market requirements. Design engineers had to be able to translate customer 
needs into product and service specifications, which then had to be produced at a high 
level of quality and at a reasonable cost. As the demand for new products escalated in 
the 1980s, manufacturing organizations were required to become increasingly flexible 
and responsive to modify existing products and processes or to develop new ones in 
order to meet ever-changing customer needs. As manufacturing capacities improved 
in the 1990s, managers realized that material and service inputs from suppliers had a 
major impact on their organizations’ ability to meet customer needs. This led to an 
increased focus on the supply base and the organization’s sourcing strategy. Managers 
also realized that producing a quality product was not enough. Getting the products to 
customers when, where, how, and in the quantity that they want, in a cost-effective 
manner, constituted an entirely new type of challenge. Since the end of 20th century, 
the fast development of information technology, in combination with that of computer 
technology and internet technology, has engendered a deep revolution in human life 
and society configuration. Facing the market challenges, entrepreneurs and managers 
are trying to seek for a way for enterprises’ survival and long-term development.    
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    21st century is called as the era of “Knowledge Society”. Knowledge is 
increasingly recognized by modern organizations as their most important tool and 
basis of innovation and the indispensable source of lasting competitive advantage. 
According to researchers (e.g. Thomas et al., 2001), both knowledge management and 
knowledge creation utilize theories of organizational learning as a platform for 
providing insight into how organizations can acquire, interpret, distribute, and 
acculturate knowledge to facilitate and create competitive distinction. In addition, 
organization theory, industrial economics, economic history, and business, 
management and innovation studies all approach the question of how organizations 
learn. However, research on these subjects is concentrated mainly in advanced 
countries (e.g. Argyris and Schon, 1978, Dodgson, 1993, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, 
Utterback, 1994, Von Hippel, 1988). Despite the fact that many developing countries 
have made significant progress in industrial, educational, and technology 
development, research on learning, capability building and innovation in those 
countries is scanty. 
    China has been in the transition stage from planned economy to market economy 
since 1978. Strictly speaking, there were no real enterprises in the sense of modern 
company theory in planned economy age, because they were just “workshops” 
subordinate to the government. Not until the economic reforms since 1980s have there 
appeared independent corporate enterprises. Currently, China is a developing country 
with unique characteristics because it is still keeping socialism and at the same time it 
is moving towards a market economy with a centralized innovation system in 
transition, which could not be seen in the history of the world. Generally speaking, 
Chinese firms’ internal and external environments have changed greatly. It is essential 
for Chinese firms to accumulate and create knowledge through effective 
organizational learning for innovation capacities and future development. Studies on 
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organizational learning issue in transition economy countries, such as China, will 
contribute to understand the theories on organizational learning and knowledge 
management created in advanced countries. 
    In this research, two successful cases of Chinese public corporations (See Note 1) 
in the background of China’s transit economy and industrial paradigm-shift are 
studied. The purpose is to depict the case companies’ organizational learning manner 
and process from the perspective of knowledge accumulation, transfer and creation, 
and at the same time to expound the external and internal factors of success. Through 
careful comparison and analysis of these two cases, the author is aiming to search for 
some important implications for Chinese firms in transition and paradigm-shift. 
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Chapter 1 Background and Purpose 
 
1.1 Background introduction  
 
1.1.1 Background of the Study 
     
21st century is called as the era of “Knowledge Society”. Knowledge is 
increasingly recognized by modern organizations as their most important tool and 
basis of innovation and the indispensable source of lasting competitive advantage. 
According to researchers (e.g. Thomas et al., 2001), both knowledge management and 
knowledge creation utilize theories of organizational learning as a platform for 
providing insight into how organizations can acquire, interpret, distribute, and 
acculturate knowledge to facilitate and create competitive distinction. In addition, 
organization theory, industrial economics, economic history, and business, 
management and innovation studies all approach the question of how organizations 
learn. However, research on these subjects is concentrated mainly in advanced 
countries (e.g. Argyris and Schon, 1978, Dodgson, 1993, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, 
Utterback, 1994, Von Hippel, 1988). Despite the fact that many developing countries 
have made significant progress in industrial, educational, and technology 
development, research on learning, capability building and innovation in those 
countries is scanty. 
    China has been in the transition stage from planned economy to market economy 
since 1978. Strictly speaking, there were no real enterprises in the sense of modern 
company theory in planned economy age, because they were just “workshops” 
subordinate to the government. Not until the economic reforms since 1980s have there 
appeared independent corporate enterprises. Currently, China is a developing country 
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with unique characteristics because it is still keeping socialism and at the same time it 
is moving towards a market economy with a centralized innovation system in 
transition, which could not be seen in the history of the world. Generally speaking, 
Chinese firms’ internal and external environments have changed greatly. It is essential 
for Chinese firms to accumulate and create knowledge through effective 
organizational learning for innovation capacities and future development. Studies on 
organizational learning issue in transition economy countries, such as China, will 
contribute to understand the theories on organizational learning and knowledge 
management created in advanced countries. 
 
1.1.2 Introduction of China’s Transitional Economy 
 
After nearly 30 years’ efforts, China has achieved great accomplishment. 
According to China Statistical Yearbook, from 1979 to 2002, the average annual 
growth rate of China’s real GDP reached 9.4%, and that of the real GDP per capita 
8.1%; in 2002 China’s total export and import amounted to 325.61 billion USD and 
295.31 billion USD respectively. With the fast growing of economy, the living 
standards of citizens also enhanced significantly: the net income per capita of rural 
residents has increased from 133.6 RMB Yuan in 1978 to 2713.0 RMB Yuan in 2002, 
the disposable income per capita of urban residents has increased from 343.4 RMB 
Yuan in 1978 to 7702.8 RMB Yuan in 2002, and according to comparable prices, the 
annual growth rates are 7.6% and 8.1% respectively. China should owe her great 
achievements to the Open Door policy and economic reform. They engendered a 
transition from planned economy to market-oriented economy, which has greatly 
raised Chinese’s companies’ vitality. 
Before 1978, 791 products were controlled under the production and distribution 
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plans made by the central government. But as of year 2005, those categories of 
products have been reduced to only five, and the rest have been shifted to the free 
economy market products. Nowadays, those products are being sold in department 
stores, supermarkets and chain stores, which are scattered everywhere in both rural 
and urban areas. Meanwhile commercial business of electronic products has 
developed rapidly, the agent system has been widely adopted by various trades, and 
great progress has been made in the circulation and delivery of commodities. New 
material circulation enterprises have replaced traditional storage and transport 
enterprises. A great variety of food, clothing and other commodities satisfy the needs 
of consumers. The total market sales grow each year. At the same time a wholesalers’ 
market has appeared in the commodities sector in which the supply and demand of 
most commodities are kept in balance, the supply of some goods exceeds the demand, 
price trends are steady, and the guiding function of the market for producers has been 
strengthened. As a result, the rights given to private enterprises for purchasing, 
producing and selling commodities have been extended. Enterprises may organize and 
establish wholesale markets and trading centers, the wholesale and retail commercial 
systems are being restructured. Through the reform, the unitary pattern in which the 
government-control economy monopolized commercial activities has been shifted 
year by year and step by step. The commodity market pattern of diversified economic 
elements and operation systems with government ownership of commerce has been 
established as the main body. Since the reform and opening began, China has 
continuously expanded the capital market by improving the credit and loan 
mechanism, and developing stock and government bonds markets. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, the reform of the credit and loan mechanism, beginning with “unified plan, 
multi-level control, connect of deposits with loans, and being responsible for making 
up differences” was developed in accordance with the ratio between assets and debts, 
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and eliminating the limits for the sizes of loans. In order to match this important 
change, new measures have been adopted, such as making market business public, 
thus standardizing and strengthening the control and adjustment of the credit and loan 
market. At the same time, the stock market grew from nothing to become a large-scale 
as symbolized by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
Generally speaking, the process of the economic reform in China is following the 
route of giving guide to market mechanisms. Socialist market economy is 
characterized by the guiding principle that the government’s macro-control is 
dominant and to have trends to control economic elements that are allowed to develop 
to enable the market to play a fundamental role in resource allocation and distribution. 
Since China is on the transitional economic stage from Planned Economy to Market 
Economy, a series of macro-adjustment and control measures are being adopted to 
carry out the reform in depth and in all aspects. The governmental ownership will 
continue to be the main form of ownership as various types of ownership are jointly 
developed, the operation mechanism of government –owned enterprises will be 
further transformed to meet the requirements of the market economy, the property 
rights and responsibilities of enterprises will be clearly defined. The open and unified 
national market system will be established, closely integrating urban and rural 
markets, providing for reciprocal flows between domestic and international markets, 
and promoting the optimization of resource allocation, changing the government’s 
function in economic management and establishing an optimal macro-regulatory 
system chiefly employing indirect means, an income distribution system based on 
distribution according to work done will be established in which efficiency is given 
precedence and fairness in distribution is taken into account, a multi-tier social 
security system will be set up to accelerate the development of China’s economy. 
To be concrete, some essential changes happened in the process of China’s 
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economic transition. 
1) The Government’s role in economy changed greatly. Prior to reform, the role 
of government in the economy was pervasive. The central government produced, 
planned and distributed practically all output. The bulk of resources, including land, 
labor, raw materials and final output were allocated under the government’s planning 
system. Production and distribution plans were determined by the central and lower 
levels of government and implemented by government-owned production or 
distribution enterprises. Most inputs were supplied in accordance with the government 
plan and most outputs were purchased and distributed as well. Private enterprises 
were generally not permitted. Over three quarters of industrial output was produced 
by the government-owned enterprises. All of the rest was produced by urban and rural 
collectives. There were no foreign owned or private sectors. 
The government’s role in the economy has changed considerably over the reform 
period as a more market-based economy. Hence in most industries planning has 
disappeared nowadays. Most enterprises produce and sell on the basis of market 
prices and the desire to get the maximize profits. Energy is one of the few sectors 
where plan controls still remain. Even in these industries however, only a small 
proportion of output is produced for the plan, the majority of output is sold at market 
prices. Most government fixed priced inputs are allocated to defense industries, 
important infrastructure projects and key heavy industries, such as iron and steel. 
China’s credit plan is still the most important means of allocating capital through the 
government-controlled banks, and only indirectly affects the fast-growing non-bank, 
non-governmental financial sectors. While this quantitative control is still in price, 
credit management is also effected by a managed interest rate regime based on 
market-determined rates. 
2) The pricing system changed to be market-oriented. Before the economic 
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reform and Open Door Policy were introduced, price of main commodities were 
decided by central government, and other less-important commodities were virtually 
set by provincial and local government. Prior to reform price fluctuation existed, but it 
was not so obvious because many prices remaining fixed at the same level for decades. 
Prices were not important factor in enterprises operations since almost all of 
commodities were produced by the government-owned (state-owned) enterprises, and 
production volumes were decided in accordance with the flow of inputs and outputs 
within the planning system. The ultimate objective of government-owned enterprises 
was fulfilling output targets rather than cost efficiency or profitability. 
Since the economic reform and Open Door Policy started, the government has 
carried out price reform step by step, along with the expansion of the commodity 
market scale and the movement of the balance between supply and demand. The 
government set new prices for sixing commodity prices as follows: 
A. Government fixed prices 
B. Government guiding prices 
C. Market regulatory prices 
The percentage of market regulating prices has been gradually increased. These 
prices were regulated mainly through the relations between market supply and 
demand. In accordance with the requirements of the socialist market economy, China 
has been establishing a pricing mechanism Macro-regulated and controlled by the 
government, and fixing prices through the market. In order to extend the regulatory 
function of the market, the government has gradually reduced the categories of 
products for planned production, eliminated the restriction that enterprises were only 
allowed to engage in production but not in business operation, and the practice of the 
government fixing commodity prices. 
3) Competition is permitted in industry activities. Competitive activities were 
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virtually not existed in the market prior to the economic reform. China’s industry was 
dominated by the central government-owned and a rigid regulatory regime. 
Production and investment by government-owned enterprises were controlled through 
a system of government authorities, usually the industrial ministries at the central and 
provincial level. Profits made by government-owned enterprises were surrendered to 
the government through their governing authorities and investment funds were 
allocated by the government from the budget. Regional comparative advantage was 
ignored and regional self-sufficiency became an overriding policy goal. Heavy and 
military industries were given first priority, but light, consumer goods industries got 
second priority. 
As a result of significant relaxation of government restrictions on the 
non-governmental sector, competition has increased considerable since 1978. The 
biggest problem was that industries did not have strong intention to make high quality 
products and to improve productivity. This must be the main reason why the 
government decided to set the present economic policy. Entry barriers for domestic 
and foreign firms to most industries and sectors, with some notable exceptions, have 
been considerably reduced. Competition in the domestic economy has grown despite 
the absence of a rigorous bankruptcy mechanism. 
 
1.1.3. Introduction of China’s enterprise reform 
 
China’s enterprise reforms started from the reform of the incentive mechanisms 
of the state-owned enterprises (SOE), and then gradually transited to the reform of the 
ownership structures of the SOEs. This process fell into three successive phases:  
In the first phase(1979-1986), the SOE reform focused on enhancing the 
incentive mechanisms of the SOEs, and the policy measures taken in this period 
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included “Fangquan Rangli”(decentralizing control rights and profits to the enterprise 
level), “Ligaishui” (transforming firm profit extraction into tax submission), and 
“Bogaidai” (transforming fiscal investment into bank credit). Before these SOE 
reforms, the government had realized that one important drawback of the traditional 
plan-economy system was the over-control and over-regulation on the SOEs, and the 
government hence decided to decentralize the control right and profit-sharing down to 
the enterprise level. And the measure of Fangquan Rangli became the distinct feature 
of this period of China’s SOE reforms.  
However, due to the lag of corresponding reforms on the macroeconomic system 
and on the institutional arrangement of resource allocation, and more importantly, due 
to the various policy burdens on the SOEs (Lin et al, 1997), the price system and 
allocation system of the economy were still in great distortion, and such distortion 
made it difficult for the government to depend on external indicators to effectively 
judge the real performance of the SOEs. Under this condition, information asymmetry 
between the government and the SOEs would result in serious incentive problems, 
such as moral hazard and adverse selection, especially when the SOE managers then 
enjoyed more control rights on the SOEs. In fact, during this period of SOE reforms, 
though both the total output and the production efficiency of the SOEs were 
significantly increased, there was no corresponding increase in state revenues, 
because large parts of the SOE profits were encroached by the SOE managers and 
workers.  
The second round of SOE reforms were carried out in the period of 1987-1992, 
and it began step into the realm of ownership structure adjusting and “Chengbaozhi” 
(contracting out the SOEs to the SOE managers) became the major policy measure 
taken in this period. The adoption of Chengbaozhi reform was initially enlightened by 
the success of the Household Responsibility System (HBS) reform in rural areas. And 
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from 1987 to 1992 two rounds of Chengbaozhi reforms were carried through 
nation-wide. The major form of contracting out the SOEs was “Liangbao Yigua”: that 
is, the SOE managers guaranteed certain levels of enterprise profit and tax rendering, 
as well as certain level of investment in technical innovation, and the total pays to the 
workers was proportioned to the total enterprise revenue.  
The reform of Chengbaozhi greatly stimulated the production enthusiasms of the 
workers and facilitated the rapid growth of public economy, but paradoxically, the 
ratio of state revenue to GDP reduced significantly in this period. In fact, when there 
were still great distortions in the economy and when the SOEs still assumed the policy 
burdens, the problem of information asymmetry could not be effectively alleviated, 
and hence the benefits of the state would unavoidably be eroded by the self-interested 
SOE managers.  
The third round of SOE reforms commenced in 1992, and from then on the 
thought of “building up Modern Enterprise Institution (MEI)” has become China’s 
mainstream guideline for China’s SOE reforms, especially for the large-sized SOEs. 
The major features of MEI were summarized by the central government as “clear 
ownership structure, definitive benefits and responsibilities, insulating SOE operation 
from government intervention, and scientific management”. And in 1993 the 
Corporate Law was published to guarantee and facilitate the SOE reforms. However, 
for those problems that could not be solved by the Chengbaozhi reform, neither could 
the MEI reforms. Because an important proposition for the MEI to improve the 
corporate governance of the SOEs is that there exist open and equally competitive 
markets of products, professional managers and corporate stocks, and the SOEs do not 
sustain any policy burdens, both of which are still not realized in China’s economy.  
 
1.1.4 Introduction of Chinese stock market and public corporation 
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The origin of the stock market in post-1949 mainland China can be traced to 
August, 1984, when Shanghai Municipal Government approved the first 
provincial-level regulation on securities. The first stock was subsequently issued by a 
household electronics company in November of the same year and became tradable in 
August, 1986 on the OTC market run by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China. In the following years, more SOEs were “incorporated” through selling shares 
to their employees and other stock companies and SOEs. However, the stockholding 
system did not become a significant vehicle for ownership reform of SOEs until the 
establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in 1990. The Chinese Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was set up in the following year as the Chinese 
equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States to 
monitor and regulate the stock market. Since then, the Chinese stock market has 
grown rapidly. As of the end of June, 2005, 1391 companies were listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange with a total market 
capitalization of 3159 billion Yuan. 
Because the stockholding system is a rather recent development in China, the 
ownership structure of listed Chinese companies has some unique features not found 
in stock markets of more developed economies. The shares are classified as A-shares 
designated for domestic investors and B-, H- and N-shares designated for overseas 
investors. A-shares are further divided into state shares, legal-person shares, tradable 
A-shares, and employee shares. State shares are those owned by the state, i.e., the 
central government and local governments. Legal-person shares are those held by 
domestic legal entities and institutions such as other stock companies, state-private 
mixed enterprises, and non-bank financial institutions. Both state shares and 
legal-person shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges, but the latter can be sold 
to other legal persons. Tradable A-shares, which can only be held by Chinese citizens 
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and institutions, are the only class of share that can be traded among domestic 
investors. B-, H- and N-shares are those that can only be held and traded by foreign 
investors. The market for B-shares is separated from the A-share market. They are 
denominated in U.S. dollars on the SHSE and in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. H- and N-shares are similar to B-share in nature, except that they are 
listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York Stock 
Exchange, respectively. Employee shares are a unique feature of the Chinese 
stockholding system and different from an employee stock ownership plan in the 
United States. They represent accumulated profits retained by the 
pre-initial-public-offering entity under the Contract Responsibility System and are 
collectively owned by the employees of the company. They are not tradable at the 
time of listing and are managed by either an investment management committee or a 
staff union. Because most listed firms do not have employee shares and they typically 
account for a very small fraction of total shares outstanding when they exist, we 
exclude employee shares from our empirical analysis in this paper. In general, the 
management owns none or very little shares. 
Currently, a typical listed Chinese firm has a mixed ownership structure. As is 
shown in Fig. 1.1, the state is the biggest shareholders of Chinese publicly listed 
companies. The legal persons and domestic individual investors are the next dominant 
groups of stockholders. Many listed firms do not have employee and foreign shares, 
and even if they do, these shares on average consist of less than 10 percent of total 
shares outstanding when combined. Restructuring to be public corporation is one of 
the most important directions of Chinese SOE reform. Publicly listed companies are 
the best portion of Chinese public corporations. However, as can be seen from Table 
1.1, their performance is still not satisfied. 
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47.13%
17.04%
0.50%
26.71%
2.73%
5.87%
State Owned
Institutional
Staff & Others
A Share
B Share
H Share
Fig.1.1 Ownership Structure of Chinese Publicly Listed Corporations
(Source: China Securities and Futures Yearbook, 2005
 
12.526.1216.5810.3316.57Average Value of Losses (Million Yuan)
12.8412.878.78.329.16Loss Maker Ratio (%)
152151977977Loss Makers
5.655.357.638.237.45Average ROE(%)
0.140.130.20.20.19Average EPS
20022001200019991998Year
6.183.972.141.83-Average Value of Losses (Million Yuan)
5.55.585.260.68-Loss Maker Ratio (%)
4131172-Loss Makers
9.699.5910.7813.1514.68Average ROE(%)
0.240.230.250.310.36Average EPS
19971996199519941993Year
(Source: China Securities and Futures Yearbook, 2003)
Table 1.1 Performance of Chinese Publicly List  Companies 
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1.1.5 Introduction of China’s international trade and inward FDI 
 
Prior to 1978, China aimed at self-sufficiency, importing only those goods it 
could not locally produce and exporting goods only to pay for essential imports. Trade 
was monopolized by 12 Foreign Trade Corporations, which were controlled by the 
central government ministries, and other trades were not permitted. Export and import 
plans covered virtually all foreign trade, applying to around 3,000 commodities. 
Exports were compulsorily produced at government controlled prices by the Foreign 
Trade Corporations under the foreign trade plan. Similarly, import commodities were 
sold to domestic firms and consumers at government controlled prices. Trade was 
therefore only a small proportion of the economy. 
China’s Open Door Policy has dramatically changed the autarkical policy existed 
in pre-1978, and aggressively accepting foreign investment and trade. As a result, 
imports and exports are increasingly led by the market forces and industrial 
comparativeness. The Ratio of imports and exports to GDP is now 42% and China is 
now the tenth biggest trading country in the world. The non-governmental sectors are 
particularly export-oriented. In fact much of China’s trade is now being conducted by 
foreign funded enterprises, and foreign funded enterprises can automatically trade on 
their own account. The highly market-oriented township and village enterprises are 
also conducting a growing proposition of China’s trade. Aside from the central 
government control, a number of other schemes are employed by the government to 
manage the trade regime. These schemes include tariffs, licenses and quotas, 
restricted trading rights, subsidies and foreign exchange controls. Nearly half of 
China’s total trade flows operate under a very liberal set of policy conditions. 
FDI inflows into China have increased rapidly over the last two decades. Before 
1979, FDI was prohibited in China, a restriction which was lifted following the 
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adoption of China’s open door policy in 1979, when a new foreign investment law 
was adopted. In its early stages, FDI was restricted to China’s Four Special Economic 
Zones and limited to equity joint ventures. Most of the FDI went into hotel 
construction and energy extraction. In 1984, a new foreign investment law was 
adopted to accelerate FDI growth and a number of preferential policies were used by 
both central and local governments to attract FDI. A sharp increase occurred after 
1992 when China reaffirmed policies of openness and market-oriented reforms 
introduced earlier. 
As Fig.1-2 indicates, growth in China’s inward FDI has been spectacular. In 
1985, annual FDI inflows were less than US$ 2 billion; while in 2004, they were 
US$ 61 billion, 30 times those of 20 years earlier. Between 1985 and 1991, the annual 
growth rate of FDI inflows into China was 14%, and annual FDI inflows during this 
period remained less than US$ 4.5 billion. FDI inflows increased sharply to US$ 11 
billion in 1992 and again to US$ 28 billion in 1993, with growth rates of over 150% 
in both years. 
By 1997, China had FDI inflows of US$ 49 billion. Although the late 1990s saw 
a small decrease in FDI inflows, the annual growth rate of FDI inflows into China 
increased again to over 10% after China joined the WTO in 2001. During the three 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, world FDI inflows declined sharply by 41%, 13% and 
12% respectively (UNCTAD, 2005), but China registered FDI growth of 15%, 13% 
and 1.4% (NBSC, 2004).Global FDI inflows increased only 2% in 2004, while China 
registered an inward FDI growth rate of 13% (NBSC, 2005). China’s share of FDI 
flows has thus increased sharply in recent years. China is now the world’s largest 
developing country FDI recipient and the world’s 2nd largest FDI recipient overall 
after the US. By way of contrast, FDI inflows into India were only US$5 billion in 
2004. 
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China’s FDI inflows fall into two broad categories. One is horizontal FDI 
involving the transfer of production from abroad to China to service the Chinese 
internal market. The other is vertical FDI which seeks to take advantage of low cost 
production (and especially low wage rates) for export of products abroad. Most 
export-oriented FDI inflows originate from other Asia economies, including South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and are in the vertical category which seeks to 
exploit low production costs. FDI flows from North America and Western Europe are 
more heavily in the horizontal category, which seeks to exploit the Chinese domestic 
market. U.S. origin FIEs sold more than 80% of their products locally in China in 
2002 according to Fung (2004). Japan lies between these two groups, with 45% of 
production for China’s domestic market. 
Fig1-2  FDI in China from 1979 to 2005
(Source: collected from statistical data of Ministry of Commerce of China)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
79-82 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Before 2002, FDI from Asian neighbors, especially from HMT (Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan), dominated FDI flows into China. As Figure 2 indicates, FDI 
from HMT alone accounted for 66% of total FDI inflows between 1979 and 1992, and 
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55% between 1993 and 2001. After 2002, the sources of China’s FDI inflows became 
more diversified with U.S and other OECD countries accounting for an increasing 
share. HMT’s share in total inward FDI has steadily declined to around 40% today. 
    Before China’s accession to WTO, less than 60% of inward FDI went to the 
manufacturing sector. But after China joined the WTO, more inward FDI went to the 
manufacturing sector and its share reached over 70% as the share of FDI going to the 
real estate sector decreased sharply. In agriculture, before China joined the WTO, 
only 1% of accumulated FDI went to this sector, but in recent years the agricultural 
share of new FDI increased to 2%. 
    As a result of these FDI inflows, by 2004 500 thousand FIEs had been 
established in China although only around 50% of them were still operating. Among 
the 242 thousand functioning FIEs, 160 thousand were industrial enterprises. Only 43 
thousand FIEs with annual sales income of over 5 million Yuan (0.61 US$ million 
equivalent) are tracked by statistical agencies in China for data purposes.               
 
1.1.6 Science and technology in China 
 
China’s economic reforms have transformed the country’s institutions that 
govern the incentive to innovate. Under China’s pre-reform innovation system, state 
patronage shaped the allocation of innovation resources. In lieu of private pecuniary 
incentives, the Government employed official recognition and professional prestige 
and advancement to motivate research focus in certain limited areas. Such a system 
was effective in supporting basic research, where albeit the private returns were low, 
the social returns and hence the attention and accolades of the Government were high. 
However such a system was ill defined to calibrate the complex incentive structure 
required for a broad-based system of commercial innovation that could effectively 
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respond to the needs of the producer and consumer sectors that lay outside the 
immediate realm of the government’s S&T priorities.  
Enterprise reform and ownership restructuring has reestablished the profit motive 
and competition interplay to the innovation process. Enactment of the patent law in 
1984 and the copyright law in 1990 signified the introduction of market-based 
incentives to China’s national innovation system. A hybrid system has now emerged 
that consists of both state-led S&T initiatives and market-based institutions. The role 
of state patronage has largely been restructured to complement the market based 
incentive structure.  
Fig. 1-3 below illustrates and expands upon the widely observed pattern of a shift 
in funding of S&T activity from the government to the firm sector. It shows not only 
the rising share of the enterprise sector in funding S&T, Fig.1-3 also shows the small 
and declining share of government-financed S&T in the important industrial LME 
sector, which accounts for nearly 42 percent of China’s total S&T spending. While 
the government’s share of S&T funding in the LME sector has fallen to just four 
percent, the enterprise share in 2002 rose to over 84 percent. The erosion of the 
industrial LME and government funding shares in total S&T spending suggest that 
S&T financing is shifting toward smaller enterprises, most of which are non-state 
enterprises, and independent research institutes. The continuing restructuring of the 
research institute sector entailing its closer alignment with enterprise sector and its 
increasing reliance on its self-finance is also strengthening the incentive for 
commercial innovation.  
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Fig. 1-3 The Roles of State and Enterprises in S&T Funding
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2003)
 
China’s National People’s Congress passed China’s first patent law in 1984. The 
substantial revision of the patent law in 1992 expanded in general the scope of patent 
protection. The impact of stronger patent protection is clearly reflected in the annual 
patent grants plotted in Fig. 1-4. On the other hand, Fig.1-4 also shows that the surge 
in patenting is driven by “utility” and “design” patents, which represent incremental 
innovations and receive far weaker legal protection than that afforded by “invention” 
patents. Moreover, from Fig. 1-5, it is obvious that despite being dwarfed by domestic 
inventors in total patent grants, foreign inventors have taken out more invention 
patents than their domestic counterparts. Foreign invention patents’ dramatic jump of 
seven fold from 1997 to 2002 is synchronized with the surge in domestic and overall 
patenting.  
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Fig. 1-4 Patents and Scientific Papers
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2003)
 
 
Fig. 1-5 Domestic vs. Foreign Patent Grants
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2003)
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1.2 Research Purpose 
 
The background introduction indicates that Chinese industries have been grown 
rapidly in the background of the open market policy since 1980’s. China is becoming 
the world plant.  The new round of industry restructuring brought about by economic 
globalization provides an opportunity for China to become a strong player in the 
manufacturing sector.  The traditional manufacturing industry is weighed down with 
former SOEs.  With low production efficiency, overstaffing, poor innovation 
capability and outdated production process, enterprises in this sector face increasingly 
grim competition environment after China joined the WTO. At present, the 
development of China advanced manufacturing industry is in full swing.  The central 
government, local governments and enterprises embarked on the renovation process 
of manufacturing in light of the actualities and their own needs.  
Generally speaking, Chinese economy has depended on labor-intensive and 
export-oriented strategy for a long time. Most of Chinese enterprises are accustomed 
to a dominant strategy of labor cost advantage. However, with the evolution of 
globalization and international industrial transfer, the advantage is gradually 
diminishing because there are many other developing countries growing up, such as 
Thailand, Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia. Chinese industries have 
been inevitably experiencing extensive industrial paradigm-shift. So, it is time for 
Chinese industries to take a new strategy to create innovation capacities to adapt to 
the industrial paradigm-shifts and to compete with other countries. To create 
innovation capacities, Chinese enterprises need to change their organization, system, 
and technology strategies. 
In this study, Chinese firms’ organizational learning in industrial paradigm-shift 
is focused on and taken into account. The research is based on a viewpoint that 
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Chinese companies had accumulated knowledge for productivity through imitation 
and late-comer advantages and that they need to create knowledge for innovation at 
the coming stage. In the “Knowledge Society” era, facing the opportunity and 
challenge of economic globalization, it is critical for Chinese firms to accumulate and 
create new knowledge, to adjust their business strategy and to prepare innovation 
capacities for the future development, because knowledge and competence are 
increasingly regarded as the most critical resources of firms and economies (Drucker, 
1993; Quinn, 1992; Reich, 1992). However, each firm has its unique organization 
characteristics and developing trajectory. On the other hand, the knowledge of firms is 
socially embedded. It is rooted in organizational coordination mechanisms and 
routines which, in turn, are heavily influenced by societal institutions. Therefore, 
firms depend differentially on different knowledge types and adopt different 
approaches to learning. The relative importance of tacit vs. explicit knowledge and 
their role in learning and innovation can vary greatly between firms in different 
societal contexts. The question is that how can Chinese enterprises obtain business 
success under such circumstances through effective organizational learning. 
In this research, we are aiming to find, observe and analyze successful Chinese 
enterprises based on case study, focusing on their organizational learning manner in 
the background of economic transition and industrial paradigm-shift. Concretely, the 
purpose of the research is to depict the case companies’ organizational learning 
manner and process from the perspective of knowledge accumulation, transfer and 
creation, to expound the internal and external factors of their success, and at the same 
time, through careful analysis, to find out some implications about effective 
organizational learning in industrial paradigm-shift. These implications from success 
experience may be helpful and suggestive for the future development of Chinese 
enterprises. 
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1.3 Object of the Research 
 
Based on field study, we found two typical successful enterprises in China, 
whose success owes much to their effective organizational learning. By direct 
interviewing to the managers and related staffs and collecting detailed data through 
publicly available sources, such as company prospectus, annual reports, reports from 
investment analysts, and the web site of the companies, the following research on 
these two enterprises in China was established. 
Case Company 1 is a logistics company of long history, which was restructured 
from a former state-owned company to a public corporation. In order to match fast 
business extension, the company tries to make use of some traditional social culture to 
educate its new employees, to foster its own talents and to maintain its brand fame. At 
the outset, the company focused on formal education and training in order to enrich 
the knowledge base for establishing smooth operation routines. Then the company 
utilized some of its historical heritages, such as “Youth League” to reinforce human 
networks favorable for group learning and intercommunications between individuals. 
This enhances employee value and organization efficiency. Up to date, the company is 
quite successful in their business, because many professional talents have been 
fostered through their effective organizational learning.  
Case Company 2 is an electronics company founded in 1980s as a Sino-foreign 
joint venture. The history of the enterprise was roughly classified to the following 
three parts: 1) Catching up through OEM manufacturing in 1980s, 2) Self-branding by 
digital era in 1990s, 3) Advancing own technology by R&D in 2000s. On different 
developing stages, the company tried to execute proactive organizational learning 
through borderless technology spillovers in the collaborations with multinational 
enterprises (MNE). There are two stages in the learning process. One is learning 
 23 
through imitation, while the other is learning through co-research. The two learning 
stages present different characteristics. On the other hand, the company attached great 
importance to flexible group learning, such as QC (Quality Control) teams. In this 
way, the company has developed to be a technology-driven, manufacturing company 
with relatively high innovation capacities.  
 
1.4 Framework of the Thesis 
      
    The thesis is arranged as follows: (See Fig. 1-3)  
Chapter 1 introduces the background of this research and research purpose. A 
brief introduction of Chinese transition economy and the current status of public 
corporations are also traced in detail 
    Chapter 2 presents a brief literature review of organizational learning, knowledge 
management, social capital and borderless technology spillovers. 
    Chapter 3 puts forwards research questions, object selection and a framework of 
analysis. 
    Chapter 4 describes in detail the case of a logistics company, mainly focus its 
organizational learning through human networks. An analysis of the case is followed 
after the case introduction. 
    Chapter 5 is another case study of an electronics company. A detailed description 
of the case company’s learning through MNEs’ technology spillovers and an analysis 
are included. 
    Chapter 6 provides a discussion about the above-mentioned case on the basis of a 
comparison study. Three viewpoints are focused in the discussion: 1) organizational 
learning outside the enterprises, 2) organizational learning inside the enterprise, and 3) 
timing of learning. 
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    The thesis ends in conclusions, implications and future study. 
Chapter I. Background & Purpose
Chapter II. Literature Review
Chapter IV.  Case 1
Chapter V.  Case 2
Chapter VI. Analysis & Discussion
Chapter VII. Conclusion & Future Study
Chapter III. Research Questions 
&  Analysis Framework
Fig. 1-6 Framework of the Thesis
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Knowledge and Knowledge Creation 
 
2.1.1 Two dimensions of knowledge: explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge 
 
Knowledge is delineated as two dimensions: explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1966, Nonaka, 1995). Explicit knowledge can be codified and 
transmitted in formal, systematic language, such as in the form of books, technical 
specifications, product blueprints, or as embodied in machines. Tacit knowledge, in 
contrast, is so deeply rooted in the human mind and is difficult to codify and transfer 
in formal language between individuals and organizations. Tacit knowledge can only 
be acquired through experience such as observation, imitation and practice.  
Human knowledge exists in different forms. It can be articulated explicitly or 
manifested implicitly (tacit). The critical differences between these two forms lie in 
three major areas. First, its codification and mechanisms for transfer. Explicit 
knowledge is also codified knowledge. It is that part of human knowledge that can be 
specified or communicated verbally, or in symbolic forms such as written documents, 
blueprints or computer programs. It belongs to Popper’s (1972) “World three” 
knowledge: it can be abstracted and stored in the “objective world”, and understood 
and shared without a “knowing subject”. Ease of communication and transfer is its 
fundamental property. Tacit knowledge, in contrast, refers to knowledge that is 
intuitive, unarticulated and that cannot be easily codified and transferred. It resides in 
Popper’s “World two” where knowledge cannot be communicated, understood or 
used without the “knowing subject”. Hence, tacit knowledge is also “subjective 
knowledge”. The notion of “tacit knowledge” was first expounded by Polanyi (1962). 
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Based on the simple observation, “We know more than we can tell”, Polanyi argued 
that a large part of human knowledge is occupied by knowledge that cannot be 
articulated. This is particularly true in the case of operational skills or know-how 
acquired through practical experience. It is action oriented and has a personal quality 
that makes it difficult to formalize or communicate. Since tacit knowledge cannot be 
specified in detail and is revealed through practice, it cannot be transmitted by 
prescription. It can be transferred only by example or observation, such as from 
master to apprentice. This restricts the range of diffusion to personal contacts. Unlike 
explicit knowledge which can be formulated, abstracted and transferred across time 
and space independently of the knowing subjects, the transfer of tacit knowledge 
requires close interaction and the build up of shared understanding and trust among 
them. 
Second, the main methods for the acquisition and accumulation of the above two 
knowledge forms also differ greatly. Explicit knowledge can be generated through 
logical deduction and acquired by formal study. Tacit knowledge, because it is based 
on experience and bodily action, can only be acquired through practical experience in 
the relevant context, i.e. “learning-by-doing”. Moreover, as noted by Nonaka (1994: 
21-2), the “variety” of experience and the individual’s commitment and involvement 
in the “context” are critical factors in determining the generation and accumulation of 
tacit knowledge. 
Third, the two different forms of knowledge differ in their potential for 
aggregation and modes of appropriation. Since explicit knowledge can be easily 
codified, it can be aggregated at a single location, stored in objective forms and 
appropriated without the participation of the knowing subject. Tacit knowledge, in 
contrast, is personal and contextual. It is distributive knowledge that cannot be easily 
aggregated and stored in objective forms; it can only be appropriated through direct 
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application. The realization of its full potential requires the close involvement and 
cooperation of the knowing subject. 
Although it is possible to make a conceptual distinction between explicit and 
tacit knowledge, they are not separate and discrete in practice. Explicit and tacit 
knowledge are mutually constituted. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that new 
knowledge is generated through the dynamic interaction and combination of these two 
types of knowledge. In a similar vein, Nelson’s and Winter's (1982) evolutionary 
theory of the firm assumes that the firm provides a special context in which the 
explicit and tacit modes of knowledge are selected by interaction with the external 
economic reality and then stored in organizational routines. Over time the quality of 
the interaction of the explicit and evolving tacit types of knowledge may lead to 
superior firm performance. However, firms can differ in their capacity for fostering 
the interaction between these two different knowledge types, and their relative 
importance and status may also differ. 
Despite the contemporary trend towards knowledge codification and the growth 
in the body of “scientific” knowledge, tacit knowledge will always remain an 
important component in all productive and innovation activities. The inherently tacit 
nature of a large part of human knowledge means that there are natural limits to 
codification. Knowledge that can be expressed in words and symbols represents only 
the tip of the iceberg of the entire body of possible knowledge. Codification inevitably 
involves a data sacrifice; some part of the knowledge will always stay behind in the 
minds of the knowing subject. More importantly, the creation of new knowledge in 
itself will necessarily involve the use and generation of tacit knowledge. Polanyi 
(1962; 1966) sees the origin of all human knowledge in individual intuition. He 
argues that scientific creativity stems primarily from deep immersion in the 
phenomenon to be explained, for that alone gives rise to intuitions about how to begin 
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the interaction. For Polanyi, science is a process of explicating the tacit intuitive 
understanding that underlies the subconscious learning of the focused scientist. In a 
similar vein, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that the key to organizational 
knowledge creation lies in the mobilization and conversion of individual tacit 
knowledge into collective knowledge. The learning and innovative capability of an 
organization is thus critically dependent on its capacity to mobilize tacit knowledge 
and foster its interaction with explicit knowledge. 
 
2.1.2 Knowledge creation process 
 
    According to Nonaka (2000), knowledge creation is a continuous, 
self-transcending process through which one transcends the boundary of the old self 
into a new self by acquiring a new context, a new view of the world, and new 
knowledge. One also transcends the boundary between self and other, as knowledge is 
created through the interactions among individuals or between individuals and their 
environment. 
Knowledge creation is depicted as a spiral process of four modes of conversion 
between the two dimensions of knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). The four modes of knowledge conversions are: (1) socialization (from tacit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge); (2) externalization (from tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge); (3) combination (from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge); (4) 
internalization (from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge). Following Nonaka, 
these processes can be conceptualized as a knowledge spiral i.e., as a dynamic 
transformation-process between explicit and tacit knowledge on the different layers. 
1) Socialization is the process of converting new tacit knowledge through shared 
experience. It comprises the exchange of tacit knowledge between individuals in order 
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to convey personal knowledge and experience. Joint experience results in new shared 
implicit knowledge, such as common values or technical skills. In practice, this could 
mean, for instance, gaining intuitive and personal knowledge through physical 
proximity and attaining direct communication with customers or a supplier.  
2) Externalization describes transformation processes. It is the process of 
articulating tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. On the one hand, this means the 
conversion of implicit into explicit knowledge, and on the other, the exchange of 
knowledge between individuals and a group. Since implicit knowledge is difficult to 
express, the conversion process is often supported by the use of metaphors, analogies, 
language rich in imagery, or stories, as well as visualization aids, like models, 
diagrams or prototypes. In order to stage a constructive discussion and reach creative 
conclusions, a deductive or inductive mode of argumentation is also very important.  
3) Combination (recently Nonaka renamed this stage Systematization, Nonaka 
1999) is the process of transforming explicit knowledge into more complex and more 
systematized explicit knowledge represents the stage. It is necessary to combine 
different fields of explicit knowledge with each other and make new knowledge 
available on an organization-wide basis. The systematization and refinement increases 
the practical value of existing knowledge and increases its transferability to all 
organizational units.  
4) Internalization is the process of embodying explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge. It comprises the conversion of organization-wide, explicit knowledge into 
the implicit knowledge of the individual. This requires from the individual that she/he 
should be able to recognize personally relevant knowledge within the organization. 
Continuous learning and the gathering of one’s own experience through 
"learning-by-doing" may support employees in these internalization processes. In this 
way, capabilities and skills ("know-how") as well as firm visions and guidelines may 
 30 
be internalized and therefore shared throughout the whole company. This tacit 
knowledge and the experience gained on an individual level can be shared again 
through socialization-processes between individuals, so that the knowledge spiral may 
be set in motion once more. 
    Nonaka also suggested that knowledge needs a physical context to be created, 
while “Ba” offers such a context. More concretely, social, cultural and historical 
contexts provide the basis for individuals to interpret information to create meaning, 
so “Ba” is the key in the process of knowledge creation to provide the energy, quality 
and place to perform the individual conversions and to move along the knowledge 
spiral.  
Originated from the Japanese philosopher Kitaro Nishida and further developed 
by Shimizu, Nonaka describes four types of “Ba” defined by two dimension of inter 
actions: the type of interactions and the media in such interactions. Each of the types 
of “Ba” offers a context for a specific step in the knowledge creation process. The 
four types of “Ba” are:  
1) Originating Ba mainly offers a context for socialization. It is a place for 
individuals to share experiences, feelings, emotions and mental models through 
face-to-face interactions. 
2) Dialoguing Ba mainly offers a context for externalization. It is a place defined 
by collective and face-to-face interactions, where individuals’ mental models and 
skills are shared, converted into common terms, and articulated as concepts.    
3) Systemizing Ba mainly offers a context for the combination of existing 
explicit knowledge. It is defined by collective and virtual interactions. Information 
technology offers a virtual collaborative environment for the creation of systemizing 
Ba.  
4) Exercising Ba mainly offers a context for internalization. It is defined by 
 31 
individual and virtual interactions, where individuals embody explicit knowledge that 
is communicated through virtual media, such as written manuals or simulation 
programs. 
The schematic illustration of knowledge creation process, four types of Ba and 
the respective relations between each single Ba and conversion modes is indicted in 
Fig. 2-1. 
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Socialization
CombinationInternalization
Externalization
Tacit Tacit
E
xplicit
E
xplicit
Explicit Explicit
Ta
ci
t
Ta
ci
t
Type of Interaction
Individual Collective
Fig. 2-1 SECI Model and Four Types of Ba
 
2.2 Organizational Learning 
     
Organizational learning is a function of an organization’s absorptive capability, 
which is the capability to recognize valuable new knowledge, integrate it into the 
organization and use it productively (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Organizational 
learning takes place at both the individual level and the organizational level. 
Individuals within the organization are the prime actors in the process of 
organizational learning. Organizational learning is not, however, the simple sum of 
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individual learning (Hedberg, 1981); rather, it is the process whereby knowledge is 
created, is distributed across the organization, is communicated among organization 
members, has consensual validity, and is integrated into the strategy and management 
of the organization (Duncan and Weiss, 1979). Organizations learn only when 
individual insights and skills become embodied in organizational routines, practices 
and beliefs (Attewell, 1992). Only effective organizations can translate individual 
learning into organizational learning (e.g. Shrivastava, 1983). All organizations are 
learning systems. Organizational factors (intention, autonomy, fluctuation and creative 
chaos, redundancy, requisite variety and leadership) affect formal and informal 
processes and structures that facilitate organizational learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). 
 
2.2.1 Three-fold typology of learning developed by Agyris and Schon (1978) 
 
A number of studies into learning from a management studies perspective 
distinguish various types and levels of learning. For example, Foil and Lyles (1985) 
distinguish higher and lower level learning. Senge (1990) differentiates generative 
from adaptive learning. Dodgson (1990) separates strategic from tactic learning. From 
an organization theory perspective, Agyris and Schon (1978) develop a three-fold 
typology of learning which they describe as single-loop, double-loop and 
deutero-learning.  
1) Single-loop learning: is an error-detection-and-correction process. According 
to Argyris and Schon, organizational learning involves the detection and correction of 
error. As shown in Fig. 2-2, Single-loop learning occurs when the error detected and 
corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its 
present objectives.  
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2) Double-loop Learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways 
that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and 
objectives. (See Fig. 2-2) 
Single-loop Learning                    Double-loop Learning
1. Cognition and monitoring of environment changes
2. Comparing corporate criterion and target to information obtained
2’ reflection of the correctness of corporate criterions and targets
3. Improvement of behaviors
2
3
1 1
2
3
2’
Fig. 2-2 Single-loop Learning & Double-loop Learning
 
3) Deutero-learning means organization learn how to carry out single- and 
double-loop learning. When an organization engages in deuteron-learning, its 
members learn about previous contexts for learning. They reflect on and inquire into 
previous episodes of organizational learning, or failure to learn. They discover what 
they did that facilitated or inhibited learning, they invent new strategy for learning, 
they produce these strategies, and they evaluate and generalize what they have 
produced. 
    According to Agyris and Schon’s model, the process of organizational learning 
can be divided into four stages: discovery, invention, production and generalization. 
(See fig. 2-3) In the first two stages, organizations focus on single-loop learning. In 
the production and generalization stages, double-loop learning happens. With the 
 34 
production and generalization of new methods, organizations modify their norms, 
policies and objectives. Hence, such learning creates innovation. 
Discovery Invention Production Generalization
Fig.2-3 Agyris and Schon’s Organizational Learning Process
 
2.2.2 Crossan et al.’s 4I framework of organizational learning 
 
Crossan et al. see organizational learning as the process of change in thought and 
action – both individual and shared – embedded in and affected by the institutions of 
the organization. The basic challenge of organizational learning, they argue, is the 
tension between assimilating new learning (exploration) and using what has been 
learned (exploitation). Managing the tension between novelty and continuity is critical 
for firms strategic renewal (March, 1991), positioning organizational learning as a 
fundamental strategic process and the principal means of achieving strategic renewal. 
    Incorporating a multilevel view of learning, the 4I framework disentangles the 
processes through which learning occurs in firms. As shown in Fig. 2-4, learning 
occurs at the individual, group and organization levels, each informing the others. 
These three levels of learning are linked by four social and psychological processes: 
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intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. Within these processes, 
cognition affects behavior, and vice versa.  
1) Intuiting is a subconscious process that occurs at the level of the individual. It 
is the start of learning and must happen in a single mind.  
2) Interpreting then picks up on the conscious elements of this individual 
learning and shares it at the group level. 
3) Integrating follows to change collective understanding at the group level and 
bridges to the level of the whole organization. 
4) Institutionalizing incorporates that learning across the organization by 
imbedding it in its systems, structures, routines and practices. 
   As shown in Fig. 2-4, the distinction between stocks and flows of learning within 
an organization. Learning stocks reside within each level (individual, group, and 
organization) and comprise the inputs and outputs of learning processes. In contrast, 
learning flows are the processes through which learning moves from one level to 
another. The feed-forward flow moves from the individual and group to the 
organization through the 4I learning processes: intuiting-interpreting, 
interpreting-integrating, and integrating-institutionalizing. At the same time, an 
analogous flow feeds back from the organization to the individual and group, forming 
a new variation of processes: institutionalizing-integrating, integrating-interpreting, 
interpreting-intuiting, and institutionalizing-intuiting. The tension between the 
feed-forward and the feedback flows of learning represents the tension between 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). The feed-forward process allows the firm 
to innovate and renew. The feedback process reinforces what the firm has already 
learned and ensures that organization-level repositories of knowledge (such as culture, 
structures, systems, procedures, and strategy) guide individual and group learning. 
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Fig. 2-4 4I Framework of Organizational Learning (Crossan et al., 1999)
 
I
G
O
Individual learning stock: Individual competence, capability, 
and motivation to undertake the required task
Group learning stock: Group dynamics and the development of 
shared understanding
Organizational learning stock: Alignment between the nonhuman 
storehouse of learning, including systems, structures, strategy,
procedures and culture, given the competitive environment
Feed-forward learning flow: Whether and how individual 
learning feeds forward into group learning and learning at the 
organizational level (e.g. Changes to structure, systems, products 
strategy, procedures, culture)
Feedback learning flow: Whether and how learning that is 
embedded in the organization (e.g. systems, structure, strategy)
affects individual and group learning
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2.3 Knowledge, Learning and social capital 
 
2.3.1 Social capital and organizational learning 
 
Theory of knowledge and organizational learning (e.g. Polanyi, 1962, 1966, 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, Spender, 1996a, 1996b, and Nonaka, 1994) seeks to 
understand the nature of knowledge and organizational learning from a pluralistic 
epistemological perspective. It makes a distinction between explicit and tacit types of 
knowledge and argues that the interaction between these two modes of knowing is 
vital for the creation of new knowledge. Their emphasis on the importance of tacit 
knowing as the origin of human knowledge indicates the social and interactive nature 
of knowledge and learning. The resource- or knowledge-based theory (e.g. Penrose, 
1959) sees the firm as a body of knowledge residing in its structures of coordination 
and organizing principles, which in turn, defines the social context for cooperation, 
communication and learning (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
1996; Fransman, 1995). At the heart of this theory is the idea that the primary role of 
the firm and the essence of organizational capability is the integration and creation of 
knowledge (Spender, 1996a; Grant, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996). Differences in the 
organizing principles of firms thus can be seen as reflecting their differing knowledge 
base and learning capabilities. The ‘societal effect’ approach, associated particularly 
with the work of the ‘Aix group’ (Maurice et. al., 1986; Sorge et. al., 1986; Maurice, 
1995), demonstrates how external societal institutions interact with internal 
organizational structures and processes to generate societally distinctive 
organizational forms. Literature on ‘national innovation systems’, most notably the 
work of Freeman (1987; 1995), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993), seeks to 
understand the link between national institutions, primarily at the macro-level, to the 
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innovative performance of firms and economies. These two approaches both 
underline the ‘specificity’ and ‘interconnectedness’ of national institutions bearing on 
industrial innovation. 
 
2.3.2 Porter’s cluster theory about knowledge, social network and innovation 
 
Among numerous researches and theories on the contributions of social capital to 
organizational learning and knowledge management, Michael Porter’s cluster theory 
is outstanding and significant. 
Porter defines a cluster as “a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities 
and complementarities” (1998). They include concentrations of interconnected 
companies, service providers, suppliers of specialized inputs to the production process, 
customers, manufacturers of related products and finally governmental and other 
institutions, such as national laboratories, universities, vocational training institutions, 
trade associations and collaborative research institutes. The existence of clusters, or 
more precisely, the tendency of firms engaged in related fields of economic activity to 
cluster across a range of industrial sectors, suggests that some of the key factors that 
determine competitive advantage lie outside the boundaries of individual firms. 
According to Porter, the significance of industrial clusters resides in the 
interactions between four sets of factors that constitute a “competitive diamond”: firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry; factor input conditions; demand conditions; and related 
and supporting industries (see Fig. 2-5). The more developed and intense the 
interactions between these four sets of factors, the greater will be the productivity of 
the firms concerned. 
Porter provides a compelling analysis of the way in which the existence of 
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clusters affects competition:  
1) by increasing the productivity of their constituent firms and industries; 
2) by improving the capacity of the member firms to innovate and thus 
enhancing their potential for productivity growth; 
3) by inducing the formation of new firms, further contributing to innovation and  
expanding the size and significance of the cluster itself. 
   
Fig. 2-5 Porter’s Competiveness Diamond Model
       
Porter views social capital as an essential part of the glue that holds clusters 
together. The competitive advantages that flow from the presence of clusters are 
closely linked to the value of the information and knowledge that firms are willing to 
share. The networks and relationships, and the degree of trust constitute the social 
underpinning of the cluster. He suggests that the mutually beneficial activities of the 
firms in a cluster generate a number of common assets that can be viewed as 
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quasi-public goods. The general level of knowledge and information built up in the 
cluster can act as such a good, if the level of trust is sufficient to generate an easy and 
mutual exchange of both tacit and codified knowledge. Similarly, the mobility of 
personnel between firms in a cluster can constitute a similar source of knowledge 
flows. Even more important, the strength of the cluster can provide an important 
stimulus to public investment in specialized infrastructure, such as communication 
networks, joint training and research institutions, specialized testing facilities and the 
expansion of public laboratories or post-secondary educational institutions. As the 
depth and value of such investments increase, so do the economic benefits flowing to 
firms located in the cluster. Thus the strength of the cluster and its supporting 
infrastructure of quasi-public goods and public institutions create a mutually 
reinforcing positive feedback loop. 
 
2.4 FDI and Technology/knowledge Spillovers 
 
2.4.1 FDI, MNE and knowledge transfer 
 
There is a significant body of theory on FDI and knowledge spillovers. Hymers 
(1976) pioneering study on MNEs drew attention to neglected aspects of MNEs role 
as global industrial organizations. By putting forward the idea that FDI represents not 
simply a transfer of capital, but the transfer of a “package” in which capital, 
management, and new technology are all combined, he characterized FDI as an 
international extension of industrial organization theory. Findlay (1978), Kindleberger 
(1984), Das (1987), et al. further extended the theory and suggest that compared to 
portfolio investment, which only involves in the cross-border flow of capital, FDI 
entails a cross-border transfer of a variety of resources, including process and product 
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technology, managerial skills, marketing and distribution know-how, and human 
capital. Another strand of models investigates the effects of FDI on growth using a 
new growth theory framework (e.g. Krugman, 1979, Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1990, 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Helpman, 1993, et al.). Whereas the neoclassical 
theory treated technological process as an exogenous process and focused on capital 
accumulation as the main source of growth, the new growth theory has focused on 
relating to the creation of technological knowledge and its transmission. It views 
innovation and imitation efforts that respond to economic incentives as major engines 
of growth. Therefore, it emphasizes the role of R&D, human capital accumulation and 
externalities. Influenced by endogenous growth models, more and more researchers 
focus on technology spillover effects through cases (e.g. Gershenberg, 1987, Rhee 
and Bolt, 1990, et al.) and econometric (e.g. Blomstrom, 1986, 1989, Kokko, 1994, et 
al.) studies.  
 
2.4.2 FDI’s technology spillovers effects 
 
Several important channels through inward FDI can benefit innovation capability 
of local firms in the host country are identified (e.g. Masfield and Romeo, 1980, Lim 
and Fong, 1982, Blomstrom and Kokko et al., 1994, Smarzynska, 2002): First, local 
firms can learn about the products and technologies brought in by foreign investors, 
for example, by means of reverse engineering. Second, spillovers can take place 
through labor turnovers whereby local firms obtain the technological know-how of 
foreign-investment-related firms by “stealing” their skilled workers. Third, inward 
FDI has a demonstration effect on local R&D activity. By their mere presence in the 
domestic markets, foreign products/technologies can inspire and stimulate local 
innovators to develop new products and process. This helps to shorten the 
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trial-and-error process of local firms in their search for inventions. Moreover, since 
the products and technologies that MNEs bring in have already been tested in foreign 
markets, the perceived risk of innovating along similar directions is lowered for local 
firms. Finally, spillovers may occur vertically from foreign firms to their local 
suppliers by means of technological know-how transfer, staff training, and so on. 
These vertical spillovers can then enhance the innovation capacity of local suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
Chapter 3 Research Question & Analysis Framework 
 
3.1 Research Question 
     
In the “Knowledge Society” era, a common sense is that companies who can learn 
faster will achieve business success. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the outer 
environment of Chinese firms had changed greatly due to radical evolution of 
economic globalization and China’s economic transition. Under such circumstances, 
many Chinese companies are experiencing extensive industrial paradigm-shifts.  
Our attention is paid to the following research questions:  
1) What elements are needed for organizational learning in industrial 
paradigm-shift? 
2) What factors are important to change Chinese enterprises to orient innovation?  
3) How can these organizations create innovation through learning? 
To answer these questions, two cases are observed and analyzed regarding their 
organizational learning in industrial paradigm-shift. In the course of our analysis and 
discussion, we employ the theory of knowledge conversion between two dimensions 
expatiated in Nonaka’s SECI model of knowledge creation. 
 
3.2 Object Selection 
 
In this research, two cases of Chinese public corporations are selected. Here, we 
expound why we chose these two cases.  
Firstly, enterprise reform is in a very important position in Chinese economy 
transition, while public corporations play an important role in enterprise reform. That 
is why the two cases belong to public corporations. 
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Secondly, the two case companies were restructured from state-owned enterprise 
and joint venture, respectively.  Each of the case companies has its unique manner of 
organizational learning due to different development history.  
Thirdly, so far, the case companies are relatively successful in their operations 
and management. They have been trying to foster their innovation capacities and have 
somehow succeeded. The success owes much to their organizational learning, as we 
observed. 
Fourthly, the two companies belong to different industry, experience respective 
developing trajectory and aim at specific innovation orientation. It is convenient for 
us to compare and generalize the common success factors which may be suggestive 
for Chinese companies.  
In the following table, we provide a compendium of the two cases. 
Taking advantage 
of borderless 
technology 
spillovers
technology shift from 
analog to digital
technology-driven, 
manufacturing 
field
Case 2:
Amoi
Electronics
Taking advantage 
of social network 
and historical 
heritages
Market becomes open 
and competitive, 
from government 
protection to market 
competition
Logistics,
Service
Case 1:
PENAVICO 
Xiamen
Organizational 
learning Manner
Industry 
characteristics
Industry
Table 3-1 Two Cases Selected in the Research
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3.3 Analysis Framework 
 
3.3.1 Analysis Framework of Organizational Learning 
 
The analysis of the two cases will focus on two angles and three aspects as 
shown in Fig.3-1. 
Two observing angles include inside enterprise and outside enterprise. 
Three aspects are environment, knowledge, including individual, organizational 
and outer knowledge, and learning, including individual learning, intra-organizational 
learning and inter-organizational learning. The bidirectional arrows mean the 
connections of each part.  
Individual
knowledge
Inside enterprise Outside enterpriseEnvironment
Organization
knowledge
Outside
knowledge
Inter-
organizational
Learning
Intra-
organizational
Learning
Individual 
Learning
Knowledge
Learning 
Fig. 3-1 Analysis Framework of Organizational learning
 
3.3.2 Analysis contents 
 
Concretely, we employ three types of analysis methodology: external analysis, 
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internal analysis and time analysis. Table 3-1 is a description of the concrete analysis 
contents. 
 1) In external analysis, we mainly focus on the outer environment changes, such 
as change in market environment, change of technology, the business relationship 
between case companies and the outside parties concerned, and case companies’ 
inter-organizational learning manner, such as characteristics and process.  
2) In internal analysis, we focus on case companies’ business characteristics, 
organization characteristics and knowledge management in intra-organizational 
learning.  
3) In time analysis we focus on how case companies match their learning manner 
with the development stages of business or technology.  
Analysis Contents 
External 
analysis
(Outside 
enterprise)
• Outer environment changes (e.g. market, technology)
• Relationship with other organizations 
• Inter-organizational learning (e.g. characteristics, process)
Internal 
Analysis
(Inside 
enterprise)
• Business characteristics 
• Organization characteristics
• Intra-organizational learning characteristics
(e.g. knowledge type, knowledge flows, knowledge 
circulation)
Time 
Analysis
learning characteristics VS business stages
Table 3-2 Analysis contents of the Thesis
 
The thesis analyzes the case companies respectively in the case study section, 
based on the above three analyses. In the discussion section, we discuss and 
summarize the key elements of Chinese enterprises’ organizational learning in 
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industrial paradigm-shift form three perspectives, inter-organizational learning, 
intra-organizational learning and timing of organizational learning, by comparing the 
two case companies. 
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Chapter 4 Case 1: Learning through Human Network 
-- PENAVICO, Xiamen 
 
4.1 Case introduction 
 
4.1.1 History of PENNIVICO Xiamen 
 
PENAVICO Xiamen was founded in 1953 as a state-owned and state-run 
company. The history of the enterprise can be roughly divided into two parts. 
1) A branch of PENAVICO China under the state’s protectionist policy 
In 1953, People’s Navigation Company (PENVICO) was approved to be founded 
by the Central Government. Since then, PENAVICO China had been the sole public 
international shipping agent. As one of the main fields of Chinese shipping industry, 
international shipping agency services had been under the state’s protectionist policy. 
PENAVICO Xiamen was a branch company of People’s Navigation Company 
(PENVICO) and entirely controlled by PENAVICO China. PENAVICO Xiamen was 
the only shipping agent in Xiamen Port until mid-1990s when China partially opened 
the business to other domestic shipping company or shipping agents. In the end of 
1980s, ocean shipping agency was the only business of the company, and less than 30 
employees worked in the company.  
2) “Second Start-up” to be a public corporation  
Since 1990s, especially China’s entrance into WTO, with the evolvement of 
Chinese economy reforms and acceleration of globalization, Chinese shipping agency 
market has been opened up gradually. Many protectionist policies do not exist any 
more. Shipping agency services is becoming increasingly competitive. In mid-1990s, 
PENAVICO Xiamen began its SOE reform, which was called “Second Start-up” by 
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themselves. In 1996, co-invested by Xiamen Port Development Co., Ltd and China 
Ocean Shipping Agency, PENIVICO Xiamen was reconstructed as a state-owned 
joint stock limited company – China Ocean Shipping Agency Xiamen Co., Ltd. 
(Because PENAVICO is still used as the brand logo, Thereinafter PENAVICO 
Xiamen is used for short in the article.) Among the stock holders, Xiamen Port 
Development Co., Ltd is a publicly listed corporation holding 60% of the stocks, and 
China Ocean Shipping Agency is an entire state-owned company, holding 40% of the 
stocks. Since then, PENAVICO Xiamen has been trying to establish a modern 
enterprise system for their business operation. On the other hand, the company has 
extended their business scope from sole shipping agency services to integrated 
logistics services in order to add the profit sources. They are also planning to extend 
their business to Third Party Logistics services in the future. 
 
4.1.2 Current status 
 
After years’ development, PENAVICO Xiamen has become the largest 
international shipping agency, a well-known international forwarding and an excellent 
provider of integrated logistics in the south-east coastal area of China. A definite 
corporate concept “Professional Agent, Personalized Service” is becoming a common 
sense in PENAVICO Xiamen’s company management and business operation. 
Currently, PENAVICO Xiamen possesses an asset of RMB 580 million and five 
subsidiaries, including an international freight & forwarding company, an air freight 
company, a customs broker company, a navigation company and a warehousing 
company. PENAVICO XIAMEN is also the equity participant of three companies, 
including a logistics company, a freight & forwarding company and a container 
company. PENAVICO Xiamen has developed close business relationship with 
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thousands of shipping and trading enterprises from more than 180 countries and 
regions and has set up a diversified business frame providing integrated shipping and 
logistics services including international shipping and container agency, sea freight 
and passenger agency, air freight, international exhibition cargo handling, 
international transshipment, NOVCC (Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier), 
coastal feeder service, Customs and CIQ brokering, bonded warehouse, sea & rail 
transportation, etc. PENAVICO Xiamen is the biggest market-sharer in Xiamen Port, 
say, more than 60% of agency market share of break-bulks, more than 70% of agency 
market share of container liners, and 100% of agency market share of foreign 
passenger ships, dealing with annually 8,500,000 tons of cargo, 350,000 
documentations and more than 5,600 voyages of vessels. 
 
4.2 Establishing Close Social Network outside the Enterprise 
 
    In compliance with business extension and recruitment of many young 
employees, PENAVICO Xiamen needs to enlarge their knowledge base, including not 
only explicit knowledge, such as professional logistics knowledge and market 
information, but also tacit knowledge, such as management know-how and corporate 
culture. One of our findings in the case study is that the enterprise has been trying to 
establish close social networks with parties concerned outside the enterprise.  
 
4.2.1 B2G and B2B E-commerce based on information system 
 
    Since mid-1990’s, PENAVICO Xiamen has begun to invest funds and human 
resource in R&D of their own information system with intelligence property right.  
As is shown in Fig.4-1, PENAVICO Xiamen’s E-commerce system links with 
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many parties and users, such as Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Maritime 
Bureau, shipping carriers, terminal operators, container yards, and cargo forwarders, 
etc. All data is exchanged very smoothly. All users can achieve following operation 
via internet including booking, declaration and confirmation, EIR and E-bill issuance, 
inbound and outbound cargo manifest transmission, container gate-in and gate-out 
message transmission. 
Freight Forwarders
Shipping Agent Supervision Authorities
Container Carriers
INT’L EDI Suppliers
E-Commerce Platform
S/O, S/I
S/O
CLP
EIR
Manifest
Cargo Declaration
Fig. 4-1 E-commerce System of PENAVICO Xiaman
 
Another information system is Automatic Inspection System (AIS). PENAVICO 
Xiamen is the sole user of AIS in the shipping agency industry at Xiamen Port. Their AIS can 
identify the vessel and trace its movement. On the E-chart, they can capture visual messages 
such as vessel name, direction, route, and cargo on board. More than that, they are also able to 
offer vessel’s timely information to the port authorities, governmental departments, terminals 
and the principals, thus uplifts the level of vessel’s maneuvering by technical application. 
As we can see in Fig. 4-2, PENAVICO Xiaman’s information system helps to form a 
smooth operation chain and to connect the company with the parties concerned to be a tie 
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network. Through such system, business information, which is mainly explicit, can be 
transferred and exchanged conveniently.  
Ship
Associate Entities Port AuthoritiesCustomer
Boarding AgentControlling Office
Ship Monitoring System 
Based on AIS
Customer Management 
System
Track Database
Commitment &Stemming 
Management System
Ship Particulars 
Database
Operation Control System
Fig. 4-2 PENAVICO Xiamen’s Information System Based on AIS
 
4.2.2 Increasing intercommunication channels 
 
    In the integrated logistics age, PENAVICO Xiamen realizes that personal 
communications with the outside organizations are critical for them to upgrade their 
service quality and to create new business scheme. Hence, PENAVICO Xiamen has 
been trying to establish and maintain close intercommunication channels with outside, 
as shown in Fig. 4-3. 
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Fig. 4-3 Intercommunication Channels for a Close Social Network
 
1) Becoming a member of Chinese Logistics Association: As a member 
enterprise, PENAVICO Xiamen is qualified to participate in legislation of industrial 
specifications and business symposiums. In this way, the company is able to obtain 
knowledge on business developing orientation; 
2) Establishing on-job education practice base with universities: They invite 
professors to give lectures on logistics theory to the employees, send talented 
employees to study for a degree, and provide education practice for university 
students;  
3) Co-researching information technology with research institutes; 
4) Setting project manager in important shipping companies; 
5) Helping partner companies to join in their E-commerce and information 
system; 
6) Inviting customers to join in their vocational meeting, listening to customers’ 
suggestions; 
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7) Having “Get-together” activities with government authorities.  
    Through these activities and in the daily works, PENAVICO Xiamen always 
encouraged and urged their managers, engineers and ordinary staffs to contact with 
individuals of the parties concerned.  
 
4.3 Reinforcing Human Networks inside the Enterprise 
 
    Another one of our findings is that PENAVICO Ximen has been trying to 
reinforce human networks inside the enterprise based on some historical heritages, 
such as Youth League (See Note 3) and Youth Civilized Units. 
 
4.3.1 “Youth League Learning Organization” 
 
    In 2001, PENAVICO Xiamen launched a campaign “Youth League Learning 
Organization”. The purpose of the campaign is to facilitate individual learning, group 
learning and a sense of collectivism for the young staffs, utilizing Youth League as a 
platform of many activities. Youth League is a traditional youth movement in the 
company. The enterprise provides chances for Youth League members to join in 
collective activities focusing on corporate culture and business development. The 
collective activities include: 
1) Political education and corporate culture education: The Company 
periodically invites senior staffs, scholars and government officials to have a 
discussion with the League members about the related laws and regulations and the 
developing tendency of the industry. The new recruits are organized to learn the 
company’s history.  
2) Project teams: The Company provides financial support and bounty to 
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encourage League members to form project teams, which are called as “Youth 
Commando”, voluntarily involving in researches.  
3) Youth symposium: The Youth League holds youth symposium once a year. 
The excellent League members make presentation in the symposiums. The top leaders 
are also invited. 
4) Suggestion contest: Every year, there is a suggestion contest in the company. 
In such contest, many young staffs have an opportunity to display their talents and 
excellence.  
5) Recreation activities: The Youth League organizes many recreation activities, 
such as sports teams, Karaoke, outings.  
6) Commonweal activities for the community, such as voluntary blood-donating, 
offering assistance to poor people, voluntary cleaning-up.  
    Every year, there is a theme of innovation for the “Youth League Learning 
Organization”. Many activities of Youth League movement will circle around the 
theme. Here we take the development of the information systems as an example to 
more concretely illustrate PENAVICO Xiamen’s intra-organizational learning for 
business innovation by utilizing human network as a platform. Since mid-1990s, 
PENAVICO Xiamen had realized the significance of information technology in the 
shipping agency industry. They introduced a set of information systems to deal in 
E-commerce business based on IBM/iSeries as the core server with double host offsite 
backup. Since 2002, with the extension of business scope and complexity of operation 
chart, PENAVICO Xiamen had found that the current information systems had 
become slow, that it was not enough to handle the huge quantity of data for 
E-commerce business, and that the information system needed to be upgraded. In 
2003, the management of the company decided to improve their information systems. 
Because there was no ready-made system for their specific uses, they had to research 
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and develop by themselves. Then this became the theme of Youth League Learning 
Organization in the year. They called this year as “the Year of Information System”. 
(The rest may be deduced by analogy. If the theme is Quality Control, it will be “the 
Year of QC”.) First, all members of the League were called upon to collect the 
feedback from the individuals they contact in their daily job and give suggestions to 
the company. Then in the meetings of Youth League groups (commonly once a week 
for political education), the League members spent time in the discussion about this 
topic and share the information they obtain. The secretary kept notes. Next, the Youth 
Symposium and the suggestion contest of that year concentrated on the theme. All 
levels of the managers, including the top leaders, were present at the symposium and 
the contest. They also participated in the discussions. In addition, the company and 
the committee of PENAVICO Xiamen’s Youth League co-sponsored and organized a 
“Youth Commando” as a project team, which was composed of technology experts 
and young engineers and technicians majoring in information technology. The 
company invested R&D funds of 4.86 million RMB into the project. They also 
applied funds from the Municipal Science and Technology Bureau and started to 
research and develop their own information systems. The project was quit successful 
after three years’ efforts. Many innovation items had been made, including X-service 
Platform for international container transportation, AIS for shipping agency and so on. 
(The current status of PEANICO Xiamen’s information system has described in the 
above section.) “Many of our inspirations originate from the suggestions presented by 
common staffs,” one of the Youth commando members said.  
 
4.3.2 Youth Civilized Units 
 
    Youth Civilized Unit is one part of Youth League. Every working section in the 
 57 
company has the right to apply to be a Youth Civilized Unit, but only the best one can 
be awarded the title of honor. The evaluation is based on four criteria, including 
working achievement, group learning, team work and societal contributions. It is a 
great honor for the unit members, because their achievements will be praised on the 
billboard. In addition, the group members will have the chance of encouragement, 
such as bounty and promotion. 
    The picture (Fig.4-4) shown below is an activity record of a Youth Civilized Unit. 
As is shown in the picture, the purpose of Youth Civilized units is to make every 
member in the group identify a sense that “We are a family!” In this family, the 
members try to provide “First-class service”, to learn to be “First-class talents”, to 
form a spirit of team work, and to contribute to the society with a spirit of civilization. 
 
First-class Service
Fist-class 
Talents
Spirit of 
Team work
Spirit of 
Civilization
We  are a family
Fig. 4-4 PENAVICO’s Youth Civilized Units
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4.4 Analysis of Case 1 
 
4.4.1 External analysis  
 
1. Outer business environment of PENAVICO Xiamen 
Since 1990s, especially China’s entrance into WTO, the environment of shipping 
industry has changed greatly, which is a great challenge to PENAVICO Xiamen. The 
changes mainly include: 1) Government’s protections have been vanishing.  
International shipping agency services is one of the main fields of shipping industry, 
which had been under the protectionist policy over a long period of time, while the 
days does not exist any more subsequent upon China’s entrance into WTO. 2) The 
market of shipping industry has become open and competitive. With the 
announcement of “the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on International 
Maritime Transportation” and “the Implementing Rules for the Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on International Maritime Transportation”, many 
domestic and foreign shipping companies and other logistics companies had been 
authorized to deal with the business of shipping agency services. 3) With the 
development of logistics theories and the rise of new trends of logistic concept, such 
as 3rd party logistics, supply chain management, shipping industry had changed from 
traditional logistics, such as shipping agency, to an integrated logistics era.  
Generally speaking, Chinese shipping industry is experiencing an industrial 
paradigm-shift. It is a challenge for PENAVICO Xiamen in this paradigm-shift due to 
some disadvantages as analyzed above, while it is also a great opportunity for the 
company to restructure its business scheme and organization structure. 
 
2. Opportunities for PENAVICO Xiamen in the industrial paradigm-shift:  
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1) As far as management and operation autonomy is concerned, the Government 
allows SOEs to restructure their institution and business arrangement instead of the 
protectionist policies. As a former SOE, PENAVICO Ximen obtained the autonomy to 
restructure to be a public corporation with a strong financial support from two 
share-holders. The company became a “real” enterprise who could execute its 
management and operation activities independently.  
2) As far as market opportunity is concerned, the company was allowed to enter 
into other businesses besides shipping agency services, which was favorable for the 
restructure and optimization of its business scheme.  
3) As far as knowledge is concerned, it was an opportunity for the company to 
enlarge its knowledge base with the extension of business operations. Firstly, the 
significance of knowledge accumulation and new knowledge creation was becoming 
larger because of institution restructure and business extension. The pressure of 
knowledge innovation urged the company to absorb knowledge from outside and 
create new knowledge inside. Secondly, they had the opportunity to penetrate the new 
market information, management know-how and industry direction, because there 
appeared much more knowledge resources, such as competitors, new customers and 
business partners.  
 
3. The relationship between PENAVICO Xiamen and the parties concerned 
    The company was a state-owned company in its history, who partially 
implemented some authority functions in the field of shipping industry. The 
production, validation and approval of some legal documents, such as documents of 
declaration of cargo, customs clearance, bill of landing, were executed by the 
company. So, the company had a traditional good relationship with many government 
authorities such as the Customs, Immigration Bureau, Commodity Inspection and 
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Quarantine Bureau, and Maritime Bureau. Meanwhile, the company is the leading 
company in the Southeast of China. PENAVICO has long been acknowledged as the 
traditional call-sign for vessels of foreign and domestic shipping companies. She has 
developed close business relationships with thousands of shipping companies, trading 
enterprises and business partners, such as terminal operators, container yards and 
cargo forwarders.  
 
4. Inter-organizational learning of PENAVICO Xiamen 
    According to the reality, PENAVICO Ximan had to rearrange their business 
scheme. The primary issues they had to take into account were how to enter the new 
market, how to construct the operation chain, and how to foster and organize human 
resource to match the business scheme. Thus, they need to learn, absorb and 
accumulate new knowledge from outside the enterprise based on inter-organizational 
learning. We found that the manner the company adopted was utilizing the social 
capital they possessed to establish a close social network favorable for their 
inter-organizational learning. To be concrete, we analyze as follows. 
    1) The company tried to develop their own information systems. PENAVICO 
Xiamen invested millions of funds in the research, development and maintenance of 
information systems ever year. Through the information system, they carried out B2B 
and B2G business on the basis of E-commerce. The E-platform helps to establish a 
close business relationship with the parties concerned, to lower various costs and to 
optimize the operation chain. As far as knowledge is concerned, the information 
systems contributed greatly to information exchange between all parties, and 
PENAVICO Xiamen could conveniently obtain much explicit knowledge, such as 
market information, customer needs. 
2) The company tried to establish a close human network, which was favorable 
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for them to personally contact with the parties concerned. Based on such human 
network as a platform, the company proactively searched for knowledge for their 
business innovation from outside. In the case, we found that the company always 
encouraged and urged their individual members to take an active part in various 
activities and to contact personally with the parties concerned. On the other hand, they 
often invited individuals of the parties concerned to comprehend and to give 
suggestions to their business. They were eager to listen to and analyze the feedback 
and advices about their innovation of business scheme and operation chain.  
    As is shown in Fig.4-5, both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge were 
absorbed into the case company through human network as a platform for personal 
intercommunications. A common vision of business innovation was the core of the 
learning and knowledge absorption. 
Logistic 
Association
Other Parties
Government
Authorities
Customers
Universities
Partners
PENAVICO
Business
Innovation
Individual Person
Tacit Knowledge
Knowledge 
Communications
Fig. 4-5 PENAVICO’s Knowledge Absorption 
form Outside Based on Human networks
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4.4.2 Internal analysis 
 
1. Business Characteristics 
Chinese shipping industry is experiencing a paradigm-shift. The changes of 
PENAVICO Xiamen’s outer environment as analyzed above engendered a 
far-reaching impact of PENAVICO Xiamen’s profit and market share. For Example, 
as shown in Fig. 4-6, a decrease of PENAVICO Xiamen’s agency market share of 
container liner was obvious. Therefore, the company had to search for new profit 
sources. In compliance with the reality, the company decided to adjust their business 
scheme and carry out a new business strategy of integrated logistics, which meant that 
they would enter into new business fields, extend their business scope and rearrange 
the operation chain. Table 4-1 is a brief description of PENAVICO Xiamen’s 
blueprint of business strategy. 
Fig. 4-6 Agency Market Shareof Container Liner of 
PENAVICO Xiamen (1995-2003) 
Source: Market Report of PENAVICO Xiamen (2003), Apr.1st, 2004
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Distinctive servicesDifferential strategy, 
3PL 
Future 
Shipping agency as main business, establish 
subsidiaries, dealing in international shipping 
and container agency, sea freight and 
passenger agency, air freight, international 
exhibition cargo handling, international 
transshipment, NOVCC, coastal feeder 
service, Customs and CIQ brokering, bonded 
warehouse, sea & rail transportation, etc. 
Integrated logisticsAfter 
Paradigm-shift
Shipping agency servicesMonopolization 
under Government  
protection
Before 
Paradigm-shift
Business ScopeStrategy
Table 4-1 PENAVICO Xiamen’s Blueprint of Business Strategy
 
2. Organization characteristics 
    With the adjustment of business strategy, many changes had occurred in the 
organization characteristics of PENAVICO Xiamen. 
    1) The company size became larger. In order to enter into new business fields, 
five subsidiaries were established. The operation chart became more complex. 
Meanwhile, the number of employees also increased greatly. In 1980’s, there were 
only less than 30 staffs, while currently, there are more than 700 staffs. Most of the 
staffs are young and highly educated, over 80% of which are college and university 
graduates, over 70% of which are under 35 years old, over 60% of which received the 
college education courses in trade, navigation, foreign languages and management.   
    2) The company adopted a multi-divisional organization structure. More than 
50% of the division managers obtained the diploma of post-graduate. They are 
professional and fairly well-known with rich theoretical and practical experience in 
the fields of shipping and logistics. They have the capability and are authorized by the 
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company to take charge of a division alone.    
    3) The top leaders are also young and highly educated. The general manager, Mr. 
Song, himself is around 42 years old. He graduated from a famous transportation 
university and obtained a diploma of Master’s degree. When he was in the university, 
he was a leader of Youth League. He had several years’ experience of working in 
Xiamen Port Harbor Bureau as an administrative official. 
    4) PENAVICO Xiamen is a former state-owned enterprise, so she has many 
historical heritages, such as the movement of Youth League. 
 
3. Intra-organizational learning of PENAVICO Xiamen 
    Through inter-organizational learning based on a close social network outside, 
much knowledge were absorbed by the individuals of the company. To transfer and 
disseminate the knowledge in the company and to accumulate in the company’s 
knowledge base, we found that PENVICO Xiamen utilized some of her historical 
heritage, such as Youth League and Youth Civilized Units, to form a close human 
network inside company. Next, we analyze PENAVICO Xiamen’s 
intra-organizational learning form the perspective of knowledge creation as follows. 
    1) We found some of the main reasons of the intra-organizational learning 
manner. A. The Company had a very long history and had many historical heritages, 
such as Youth League, Youth Civilized Units, which could be utilized in their 
learning. B. The general manager was familiar with the affairs of Youth League 
movement because of his experience. C. Most of the employees are young people, 
which was suitable for the company to launch the campaign of “Youth League 
learning organization”.  Therefore, the company was able to utilize this historical 
culture to carry out many activities and to foster a sense of collectivism.  
2) The company was pursuing a goal of business innovation, which required tacit 
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knowledge to be transferred and disseminated. Such a close human network 
established by the company forms a platform or “Ba”, as was mentioned by Nonaka, 
for close meetings and face-to-face communications. On this platform, individuals 
could share experience, make sense, empathize and practice with each other. Thus, 
innovated tacit knowledge on business or technology could be exchanged, transferred 
and converted. We can find in the information system example that the movement of 
Youth League Learning Organization helped to form an originating Ba through the 
ordinary staffs’ personal contacts with the individuals of the parties concerned in their 
daily works, to form a dialoguing Ba through Youth Symposium and suggestion 
contests, etc., to form a systemizing Ba through the Youth Commando’s R&D 
activities and to form an exercising Ba through the staffs’ utilizing the system and 
their feedbacks. In this sense, such close human network could also become a 
knowledge network favorable for innovation-oriented learning. 
    3) A sense of collectivism and solidarity derived from common historical culture 
formed a strong shared vision for the company’s innovation of business scheme. As is 
shown in Fig.4-7, on the one hand, based on the shared vision, knowledge flowed 
smoothly on the platform, where individuals exchanged their knowledge with each 
other; on the other hand, many activities, such as vocational meeting, youth 
symposium, suggestion contest, created chances for individuals to transfer their 
innovated knowledge to the groups, and then to the organization. 
4) Based on various activities of Youth League, such as Youth Symposium, 
suggestion contests, the information and knowledge obtain by individual persons 
found channels to reach to the group level and the highest management. In this sense, 
the knowledge flows not only move from organization to groups and individuals 
(exploitation), but also from individuals and groups to the organization (exploration). 
(See Fig. 4-8) 
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4.4.3 Time analysis 
    As is analyzed above, a profound paradigm-shift of Chinese shipping industry 
occurred between mid-1990s and 2001 when China entered into WTO. We found that 
during this period of time, radical changes also happened in the case company 
concerning the business scheme, corporate institution, attitude of organizational 
learning, etc. Here, we generalize the changes of PENAVICO Xiamen by a 
comparison between before and after the industrial paradigm-shift. (See Table 4-2) 
1) Form platform based on human 
networks, close meetings, face-to-
face communications between 
individuals and groups
2)A combination of Exploitation & 
Exploration learning
Formal Top-down 
education 
Intra-
Inter- Proactive searching for knowledge 
based on social network, personal 
intercommunication channels,
Passive, unilateral 
absorption of 
explicit knowledgeOrganizational
learning
Modern logistics
Business innovation
Traditional shipping 
agency services
Business scheme
Public corporation
Multi-divisional structure
State-owned 
Line authority
Institution
After 
Paradigm-shift
Before 
Paradigm-shift
Table 4-2 A Comparison Between Before and After Industrial Paradigm-shift
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Chapter 5 Case 2: Learning through Borderless Technology 
Spillovers – Amoi Electronics 
 
5.1 Case Introduction 
 
5.1.1 History of Amoi Electronics 
Amoi Electronics Company Limited (Thereafter Amoi) was founded in 1981 as 
the first Sino-foreign joint-venture company. The history of the enterprise was 
roughly classified to the following three parts: 
1) Catching-up through OEM manufacturing in 1980s: 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Amoi mainly engaged in OEM (Original 
Equipment Manufacturer) production of VTR (video tape recorder) for some Japanese 
MNEs, such as Sony and Panasonic. Assembly lines, production technology and 
management technology of Japanese companies were introduced and utilized in the 
process of production and management. 
2) Self-branding by digital era in 1990s: 
In mid-1990s, electronics industry entered into the age of digital technology, 
which enabled many late-comer enterprises to penetrate market by their own brand 
items. As a matter of fact, in 1997, Amoi created the first own brand name  
Amoisonic and was restructured as a public company and listed in Shanghai stock 
market. Amoi began to research and develop, produce and sell digital household 
electronics products, such as VCD, DVD players. 
3) Advancing own technology by R&D in 2000s: 
In 2000, Amoi began to research and develop GSM mobile phone. In March, 
2001, Amoi became an authorized GSM mobile phone manufacturer. Since then, 
Amoi has transformed its main business to R&D, production and sales of mobile 
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communication terminal products. In this period Amoi concentrated on study and 
application of core technologies from foreign advanced companies. They established 
close relations with many foreign advanced companies in the field of R&D, 
standardization, purchasing, manufacturing and sales of digital products. They even 
established a collaborative lab with some foreign companies in Silicon Valley, 
researching and developing digital home theater and hard disc recorder. 
 
5.1.2 Current status: 
 
In 2003, Amoi started a 3C (communication, Computer and consumer 
Electronics) Interrelated Diversification Strategy. Since 2004, Amoi has become a 
mature 3C manufacturer in China and formed a 6 product division system of mobile 
phone, video, audio, communication, photoelectron and IT. They launched a brand 
name re-engineering project and announced a new brand name logo -- Amoi. In order 
to make full use of core technologies, Amoi established strategic partnership with 
many worlds famous MNEs, such as Microsoft, Intel, Qualcom, conducting 
co-research in 3C technologies. Currently, Amoi has an employment force of over 
20,000, including a product R&D team of 1,200 engineers. The average age of 
employees is about 29. By 2006, Amoi has had a total asset of 4.5 billion RMB and 
has reached the annual production capacity of 10 million mobile phones and 2 million 
units of other products. 
 
5.2 Learning from Advanced MNEs 
 
Our findings in the study of Amois proactive learning in the collaborations with 
MNEs were the following two points: 
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1) There are two stages in the learning process. One is learning through imitation, 
while the other is learning through co-research. 
2) The two learning stages present different characteristics. 
 
5.2.1 Learning through imitation 
 
In 1980s, Amoi entered into OEM agreements with some Japanese companies, 
such as Sony and Panasonic, producing VTR. Amoi induced VTR assembly lines and 
production technology from Japanese companies. Japanese companies sent their 
engineers to help Amoi to construct standard workshop, to set up the equipments and 
to train Amoi’s engineers. The agreements also included the training of Amoi’s 
engineers at Japanese sites. Meanwhile, packaged technologies were transferred to 
Amoi with a set of explicit knowledge, such as blueprints, technical specifications and 
production manuals.  
In order to acquire these technologies, a taskforce was formed in Amoi. The 
members comprised engineers and technicians from various sectors. The participants 
of those activities included the current president, Mr. Li, 42 years old, graduated from 
a famous university in Shanghai, majoring in Electronics Engineering. He was 
awarded a degree of MBA. Since 1985, after graduation from university, he has been 
working in Amoi. He was promoted from grass roots. He has ever taken in charge of 
Quality Inspection Department, Planning Department, Office of Export Affairs and 
R&D Center. He himself had the experience of being trained in foreign companies 
and working with foreign engineers. Also, the current vice president, Mr. Huang, was 
an interpreter of Japanese engineers. The taskforce members worked all day long with 
the Japanese engineers. In the evening, they studied literature materials, such as 
blueprints and instructions for assembly, disassembled and reassembled sample 
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products and discussed with each other. They collected questions and consulted 
Japanese engineers the next day. In this way, the members of the taskforce mastered 
the technology essentials and obtained valuable technology information. The most 
competent engineers trained by Japanese companies were assigned to production and 
production engineering departments. They soon became the backbone of production 
technique, trainers of workers and consultant of problem-solving.  
Based on the assembly lines, production technology and product blueprints 
introduced from Japanese company, the company began to produce VTR. But more 
important is that the company gradually understood many things about technical and 
managerial know-how through such kind of technology imitation, such as how to 
organize production, how to open up marketing channels, what kind of product was 
popular in the market, what kind of employees should be recruited, how to train them, 
etc. This kind of knowledge was not transferred directly from Japanese companies. It 
was through observation, trial-and-error practice and discussion by individual persons 
that the company learned the know-how.  
Those kinds of much amount of explicit and tacit knowledge accumulated inside 
the enterprise contributed so much to the huge advance of the enterprise in digital era. 
The technology shift from analog to digital brought them tremendous opportunity to 
penetrate the market, because it made much easier to produce the items by assembling 
many module units purchased from outsourcing companies. However, if they have not 
accumulated the knowledge, it would not be so easier to get into the market. 
 
5.2.2 Learning through co-research 
 
By mid-1990s, Amois technical and managerial knowledge base has upgraded to 
a higher level through the above learning. They have fostered many talented engineers, 
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who can develop various products besides VTR applying CAD system. Amoi began 
to conducted co-research with MNEs. With the company enlarging, the number of 
engineers increasing, R&D capability upgrading, the range and intensity of 
co-research is growing deeper and deeper.  
Comparing with imitative learning, co-research learning presents some 
characteristics: 
1) Guided by R&D strategy: The Company realized that core technologies of 
electronics products were only mastered by some top companies and that Amoi hadn’t 
had the capacity to develop core technologies at current stage. But they believed that 
the company could make good use of core technologies developed by those foreign 
top companies and develop new products through deeply comprehending the demands 
of the market and consumers. So, Amoi adopt a strategy called “Secondly Core 
Technology Strategy”. The strategy includes two stages: At current stage, Amoi 
concentrates on innovation and breakthrough of product application functions, such as 
appearance design, application functions and system integration. In the future, Amoi 
will gradually approach radical innovation of core technology. The guideline of R&D 
at current stage is “Practical application and Exquisite refinement”. Technology 
tracking is the main task. 
2) Warranted by various institutional, managerial and operational measures: a) 
Amoi changed its organization to be more flat and deconcentrated. Six subsidiaries 
and divisions correspond to Communication, Computer and Consumer Electrics 
respectively so as to develop corresponding products more professionally. A complete 
ERP system enables the six subsidiaries and divisions to implement professional 
operations of development, procurement, production and sales on the identic network 
platform. b) Amoi made great efforts to expand its marketing and customer service 
networks domestically and abroad. Through the networks, feedbacks of customer 
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needs and information of rivals are quickly transmitted to decision-makers and R&D 
groups. C) Amoi launched its “China Best” brand name re-engineering project to 
reinforce brand reputation. d) Amoi has passed the authentication of world famous 
institute BSI for ISO9001 and TL9000 certification. e) Amoi recruits young 
employees (around 20s on average) and promotes young managers (around 30s on 
average) in the company. 
3) Various co-research modes: At the outset, Amoi adopts short-term co-research 
modes, such as co-investment in collaborative lab abroad, sending competent 
engineers to join in a certain project, temporarily retaining foreign engineers from 
MNEs to work in Amoi’s R&D sector. Later, under strategic partnership agreement, 
Amoi undertook long-term co-research with famous MNEs on an integration basis. In 
this way, they could track the direction of technology development. 
4) Obtaining knowledge through multi-channels: a) Amoi set up research centers 
in Xiamen, Shanghai and Nanjing respectively, because in the latter two cities there 
are thousands of affiliates and many R&D centers of MNEs. It is convenient for them 
to approach the knowledge resources and human resources. b) Amoi has set up many 
sales subsidiaries abroad. Frequently, they shared procurement and marketing 
channels with MNEs. c).A Japanese expert was assigned to be vice general manager 
of a division, taking charge of R&D and production of PHS products. He was once an 
engineer of a famous Japanese MNEs, having rich experience in R&D advanced 
digital technology. d) Every year Amoi sends excellent employees to foreign 
companies for a study tour.  
Various kinds of knowledge, especially tacit knowledge of technology, 
marketing, management, concept, etc., were absorbed in the process of such 
co-research learning and contributed greatly to Amoi’s core competence. They are 
enabled to track the updated directions of products and to establish a capacity of 
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applicative innovation based on core technologies of MNEs. More importantly, they 
are accumulating tacit knowledge for the future development at a higher innovation 
level. 
 
5.3 Flexible Team Learning inside the Company 
 
Amoi attaches great importance to team learning. A case in point is QC (Quality 
Control) team. 
In order to popularize TQM (Total Quality Management), Amoi organizes QC 
teams to learn basic knowledge of TQM and methods of job improvement. Currently, 
there are more than 800 QC teams in the company. Each team consists of 5-9members, 
including a team leader, a secretary, investigators and statisticians. The team members 
are combined together freely and voluntarily. The team leader is selected 
democratically. Commonly the team members come from the same department and 
have good relationship. The TQM Popularization Office provides periodical training 
to the team leaders. Usually, QC teams conduct an activity once a month. Each time, 
before the activity, they pose a problem of jobs or routines. Then they hold a meeting, 
discussing on the problem-solving in a free atmosphere. The achievements will be 
presented in seminar held by workshop section, department or company level, 
according to the quality of the achievement. Excellent achievements will be 
encouraged with bounty. In this way, Amoi greatly upgrades customer satisfaction 
towards products and services. 
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5.4 Analysis of Case 2 
 
5.4.1 External analysis 
 
1. Presence of multinational enterprises (MNE) and knowledge spillovers 
    With the expansion of economic/industrial globalization, more and more 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), research 
and development (R&D) and resource allocation all around the world. China， under 
its “market for technology” policy1, has been the largest recipient of FDI among the 
developing countries and one of the important R&D bases of MNEs since 1990s 
(UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, 2005). MNEs’ transnational operations and 
R&D activities, and international industry transfer inevitably engender technology 
spillovers. This is one of the most important opportunities for Chinese local firms to 
induce, assimilate and absorb existing advanced technologies from advanced 
countries. 
 
2. Technology of electronics industry shift from analog era to digital era 
    In mid-1990s, electronics industry entered into the age of digital technology,. 
The technology shift brought them tremendous opportunity to penetrate the market by 
their own brand items, because it made much easier to produce the items by 
assembling many module units purchased from outsourcing companies. Hence, the 
technology shift brought a radical industrial paradigm-shift to Chinese electronics 
enterprises. 
 
3. Characteristics of Amoi’s inter-organizational learning  
The case company we studied successfully transformed itself from a small-size 
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firm dealing in OEM manufacturing for MNEs to a listed electronics hi-tech 
enterprise with relatively strong innovation capacity and core competence. Comparing 
with many other Chinese local firms, the case company shows many unique manners 
in their learning through borderless technology spillovers. 
Here, we analyze the case from the perspective of knowledge transfer and 
knowledge creation in the process of their effective learning as follow: 
1) Learning manner and learning orientation 
MNEs’ presence in the host countries forms a platform, or “Ba” as mentioned by 
Nonaka, for local firms to share experience, make sense, empathize and practice. It is 
much easier for local firms to learn explicit knowledge from MNEs, because the 
former can buy the latter’s products, blueprints and equipments in the market place 
and obtain the technology based on studies. However, tacit knowledge is more critical 
for a firm’s innovation capacity (e.g. Cavusgil et al. 2003), but, unfortunately, it is 
difficult to buy in the market place. Many Chinese local firms focus too much on the 
explicit knowledge by inducing foreign manufacturing facilities and technologies. 
After that, they commonly depend much on total cost advantage. This causes severe 
competition among indigenous firms. The fact is that, in many cases, the technology 
gap didn’t narrow, instead, the gap to some extent enlarged ((Lv, 2006)). Our findings 
in the study of Amoi’s proactive learning in the collaborations with MNEs were the 
following two points: There are two stages in the learning process. One is learning 
through imitation, while the other is learning through co-research. The two learning 
stages present different characteristics. At the early stage, the company in the same 
way mainly absorbed explicit knowledge from MNEs. But, when the company 
accumulated much explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge inside, they switched 
learning orientation to absorbing MNEs’ tacit knowledge, such as product concepts, 
directions of R&D development, etc., in the way of co-research learning. This 
 77 
contributed greatly to their application innovation. More importantly, based on this 
capacity, they will have the chance to accumulate and create enough tacit knowledge 
for larger advance in the future. 
2) Tacit knowledge absorption in imitation learning and co-research learning 
It is found in the case company’s learning process that the company is trying to 
create favorable conditions for individual persons to personally contact with advance 
tacit knowledge from MNEs. As is showed in Fig. 5-1, at imitative stage, tacit 
knowledge transferred from MNEs to local firms through few personal 
communications and some particular media, such as blueprints, machines, etc. Such 
kind of tacit knowledge transfer was basically indirect; while at co-researching 
learning stage, Aomi made much effort to open up many channels for extensive 
personal intercommunications. Through direct communications, Amoi not only 
absorbed tacit knowledge from MNEs but also created new ideas and new knowledge. 
In fact, co-research is not new in the worldwide inter-organizational learning, but it 
seems that many Chinese local firms have settled into imitative learning.  
    
MNEs Amoi MNEs
Amoi
Individual
Tacit Knowledge
Tacit Knowledge Communications
Imitation 
Learning
Co-research 
learning
Particular Media 
Tacit Knowledge Transfer
Fig. 5-1 Tacit Knowledge Absorption of Amoi
in Imitation Learning and Co-research Learning
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5.4.2. Internal analysis 
 
1. Business characteristics 
    As far as technology is concerned, Amoi is a late-comer in the market. According 
to our study of the case, we found that the company’s business strategy is closely 
related to the technology trajectory. Here, we generalize Amoi’s business strategies 
and technology development in various periods of time in Table 5-1. 
R&D, produce and sale of 
mobile communication 
terminal products
Applicative R&D capacity of 
mobile phone based on others’ core 
chips
Since 2000
3C Interrelated 
Diversification Strategy
Enhanced application technology of 
3C products
Since 2003
R&D, produce and sale of 
digital household products 
by self-branding
Productivity of digital products
Foster a team of engineers
Improved technology capability
Mid-1990s
OEM for Japanese 
companies
Assembly capability of VTR
Lack of R&D capability
1980s & 
early 1990s
Strategy Technology
Table 5-1 Amoi’s Technology and Business Strategy
 
We also found that the process of Amoi’s technology development is like 
stepping up the stairs. Technology upgrades to a higher level when explicit knowledge 
and tacit knowledge is accumulated and created to an extent. The qualitative change 
takes place based on innovation-oriented learning through borderless technology 
spillovers and knowledge creation through managerial innovation and unremitting 
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efforts. Fig. 5-2 is a schematic description of Amoi’s technology development. 
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Figure 3  A Model of Amoi’s Technology Development
Fig. 5-2 Amoi’s Technology Development
 
2. Organization characteristics 
    1) Amoi organizes QC teams to learn basic knowledge of TQM and methods of 
job improvement. Currently, there are more than 800 QC teams in the company. They 
are closely communicated teams with common vision. 
    2) The top leaders of Amoi play a significant role in the innovation-oriented 
learning and knowledge creation. There are some unique characteristics in their 
knowledge background. First, they are young and highly educated, which means their 
have the basic knowledge of advanced management. Second, they have been working 
in the company for very long time and promoted from grass roots, which enabled 
them to be familiar with the firm’s various situations. Third, they have had many 
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personal experiences in dealing with MNEs since the early stage of the company. The 
top leaders’ knowledge background enables them to have a keen insight into the 
firm’s technology and knowledge base. Based on this, they could formulate suitable 
technology strategies and a flexible organization to match innovation-oriented 
learning, and advance technology and knowledge. 
 
3. Intra-organizational learning of Amoi 
    Top-down education and training is still a typical way of organizational learning 
in most Chinese companies, while the case company extensively adopt team learning 
manner, which is considered to be an effective learning manner in the organizational 
learning researches (e.g. Peter Senge, 1995). 
Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in personal experiences, subjective insights, 
values and feelings and can only be shared through extensive dialogues and 
discussions. Amoi’s 800 QC teams are organized flexibly based on common vision, 
teamwork and tight relationships. It is thought to be effective to share and accumulate 
tacit knowledge, and to create new knowledge through the circulation of the two 
dimensions of knowledge. In this sense, the case company has a more flexible 
organization, which contributes to effective organizational learning and knowledge 
creation, comparing with many other Chinese local firms. Fig. 5-3 shows the tacit 
knowledge communications through flexible groups in Amoi. 
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Individual
Individual
Individual Individual
QC TeamsShared vision:
Innovator 
from China
Fig.5-3 Tacit Knowledge Communications in Flexible Groups  with 
Shared Vision in Amoi
 
5.4.3 Time analysis 
 
Technology breakthrough often needs a turning point. In the case we studied, the 
technology shift from analog to digital, which brought a radical industrial 
paradigm-shift for Chinese electronics industry, brought the case company huge 
opportunity to penetrate the market and conduct application researches based on 
module units they could purchase from outsourcing companies. Amoi made full use of 
this opportunity to absorb knowledge, create its own brand and capture market. Amoi 
could seize the opportunity because she had accumulated much knowledge, both 
explicit and tacit ones, to upgrade the technology through unremitting efforts.  
The paradigm-shift based on technology shift in Chinese electronics industry had 
a far-reaching influence on Amoi’s business strategy, technology development and 
organizational learning manner, which we summarized in Table 5-2. 
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Learning based on flexible 
organization with shared vision
Top-down 
education
Intra-
After 
Paradigm-shift
Before 
Paradigm-shift
Technology analog digital
Business OEM Self-branding 
Advancing technology by R&D
Organizational
Learning manner
Inter- Imitative
Particular media
First stage: Co-research
Second stage: Strategy partnership
Various personal communication 
channels
Table 5-2 A Comparison Between Before and After Industrial Paradigm-shift
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
 
    In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we introduced two cases of Chinese public 
corporations mainly regarding their organizational learning in the background of 
China’s economic transitions and the evolution of economic globalization. We also 
provided external analysis, internal analysis and time analysis on the case companies’ 
inter-organizational learning and intra-organizational learning respectively.  
    In Chapter 6, we will discuss and summarize the key elements of Chinese 
enterprises’ organizational learning for innovation capacities in industrial 
paradigm-shift by comparing the above two cases.  
Prior to the summary and discussion, the significance of tacit knowledge 
management and the relationship between tacit knowledge and innovation in 
organizational learning should be emphasized again, because they are critical for 
Chinese enterprises to create innovation capacities in the globalization and knowledge 
society era. In the recent literature, much attention has focused, in particular, on the 
importance of 'tacit knowledge' for sustaining firms’ competitiveness, and its role in 
technological innovation and organizational learning. Tacit knowledge represents the 
principal source of sustainable competitive advantage in an increasingly dynamic and 
turbulent business environment (Grant, 1996; Hall, 1993; Winter, 1987). The 
emphasis on the importance of developing distinctive core competence, intangible 
assets or firm-specific 'dynamic capabilities' has emerged as a central theme in the 
resource-based strategic management literature (Prahadlad and Hamel, 1990; Itami, 
1987; Teece and Pisano, 1994). Interest in tacit knowledge has also grown rapidly as 
studies of technological innovation and diffusion have increasingly identified tacit 
knowledge as an important component of the knowledge used in innovation (Dosi, 
1988; Rosenberg, 1976 and 1982; Pavitt, 1987; Senker, 1995; Howells, 1996). The 
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growing complexity of technological systems and rapid change in the knowledge and 
scientific base has made tacit knowledge ever more important in the process of 
learning and knowledge accumulation (Lundvall and Borras, 1997). Literature in the 
field of organizational learning emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge in 
collective learning and organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Spender, 1996b). 
In the next section, the summary and discussion will prosecuted from the 
following three perspectives: learning outside enterprise, learning inside enterprise 
and timing of learning.  
 
6.1 Learning outside Enterprise 
 
    As is mentioned in the literature review, knowledge of the firm is socially 
embedded. It is rooted in organizational coordination mechanisms and routines which, 
in turn, are heavily influenced by societal institutions. Societal level factors such as 
education and training systems and social relationships between different 
occupational groups are important factors shaping organizational structures and 
processes in which the knowledge of the firm is embedded. In this sense, we found 
important implications of Chinese enterprises’ inter-organizational learning in 
industrial paradigm-shifts. 
    1) Chinese enterprises must identify the outer knowledge sources according to 
their business environment. In other words, they should know where their can obtain 
the knowledge. 
    In Case 1, PENAVICO Xiamen is a leading company in the region. They are 
aiming to rearrange their business scheme and enter into the new market. Therefore, 
form government authorities, they can obtain the knowledge of policy orientation; 
 85 
from universities and research institutes, they can obtain the theoretical knowledge of 
modern logistics and the knowledge of new technology; from the parties concerned in 
the market, such as partners, customers and even rivals, they can obtain the 
knowledge of their management model and operations. That is to say, they can obtain 
knowledge in their social network. 
    While in Case 2, Amoi is a late-comer in electronics industry. In order to 
improve and upgrade their technology, they located MNEs’ technology spillovers as 
the main knowledge source, because MNEs are the possessors of advanced “explicit” 
knowledge (e.g. information on products, patents, equipments and assembly lines). 
Whilst, “tacit” knoledg, such as managerial know-how, corporate culture, sense of 
value, entrepreneurship, is the more important element which enables them to possess 
strong innovation capacity and global competence. 
    2) Another important question Chinese enterprises must take into account in their 
inter-organizational learning is how to absorb knowledge from outside. As we 
observed in the two cases, Chinese enterprises should open up intercommunication 
channels as many as possible. In Case 1, PENAVICO Xiamen developed their own 
information system to collect and exchange explicit knowledge, such as market 
information. They also created favorable conditions for personal connections with the 
parties concerned through various activities. Tacit knowledge such as suggestions for 
their business and technology were obtained by individuals of the company. In Case 2, 
Amoi formed task force to absorb explicit knowledge from blueprints, machines and 
products, etc. They also established R&D centers and carried out co-researches with 
MNEs to absorb tacit knowledge based on personal communications. 
3) Chinese enterprises can depend differentially on different knowledge types 
and adopt different approaches to learning. The relative importance of tacit vs. 
codified knowledge and their role in learning and innovation can vary greatly between 
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firms in different social contexts. For example, PENAVICO Xiamen adopts a learning 
manner through close tie with parties concerned, because as a leading company, they 
have traditional good social relationships. While Amoi adopted imitation learning in 
the early stage and co-research manner in the later stage. In this sense, the most 
important thing is not the learning manner itself but the adaptability and effectiveness 
of the learning manner. 
 
6.2 Learning inside Enterprise 
 
According to Nonaka (1995), knowledge can be transferred from outside, but 
competitive knowledge can only be created inside the organization. The creation of 
knowledge is based on the circulation of explicit mode and tacit mode. Knowledge 
creation as a source of innovation of business/industries strongly depends on tacit 
knowledge produced in individual persons and the way to share tacit knowledge and 
transform it to explicit knowledge in organization. 
    By comparing the two case companies’ intra-organizational learning, we found 
some indications for Chinese enterprises’ intra-organizational learning concerning 
tacit knowledge management and knowledge circulation. 
     First, at least three elements are indispensible: 1) flexible and harmonious 
organization; 2) the platform for group learning; 3) a shared vision for the groups. In 
Case 1, PENAVICO Xiamen utilized the traditional heritages, such as Youth League 
and Youth Civilized Units to form such groups conducive for their group learning; 
while in Case 2, Amoi made good use of TQC teams, which they learned from 
Japanese companies during their long-term cooperation with these companies. This 
indicates that for Chinese enterprises, each of them has their unique heritages during 
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the course of development, which they can adopt the useful parts to carry out group 
learning and profit the knowledge circulations for new knowledge creation. The 
platform for group learning is indispensible, but the formation of such platform can 
vary from case to case according to the reality of different company. 
    Second, Chinese enterprises must change their organization structure to make it 
not only favorable for knowledge feedback flows but also for feed-forward flows, as 
shown in Fig. 6-1. Rigid organization structure and top-down education and training 
are still a typical way of learning in most Chinese enterprises. However, the 
traditional bureaucratic, hierarchical model of organization is ill suited to tacit 
knowledge and hence detrimental to learning and innovation. In the cases we studied, 
they have been trying to change their organization to be decentralized and flexible. It 
is turned out that the organic model of organization, based on decentralized problem 
solving, horizontal coordination and cross-functional team working, is the most 
appropriate organizational form for the creation of tacit knowledge and learning. It is 
indicated that Chinese enterprises should change internal organization as a key 
strategy for promoting the learning and innovative capabilities of firms. 
 
6.3 Timing of Learning 
 
Industrial paradigm-shift is always a great challenge for enterprises, because it is 
inevitably followed by the business environment changes and the break of business 
traditions. As for the two cases we observed, the paradigm-shift in their industries 
makes it a good opportunity for them to involve in innovation.  
In Case 1, the paradigm-shift engendered an extensive competition in the market, 
but meanwhile, the company had the opportunity to enter into new markets and 
rearrange their business scheme. 
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Fig. 6-1 A Model of Knowledge Flows for Chinese Enterprises’ Learning
 
In Case 2, electronic technology shift from analog to digital provided an 
opportunity to penetrate the market and conduct application researches based on 
module units they could purchase from outsourcing companies. In reality, such 
opportunities are often existent in paradigm-shifts. This implies that industrial 
paradigm-shift can be a good opportunity for Chinese enterprises to challenge 
innovation. 
A question arising here is why many Chinese enterprises couldn’t seize the 
opportunity while some successful companies such as the two case companies 
could. The success of the two case companies may indicate some of the hints.  
First, to adapt industrial paradigm-shift, the case companies have 
accumulated much knowledge, both explicit and tacit ones, through unremitting 
efforts through different manner of organizational learning.  
Second, the case companies changed their business strategy and organization 
structure to fit for their learning manner. 
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Third, the unique knowledge background and experiences of the top leaders 
enable them to have a keen insight into the firms’ business/technology and 
knowledge base. Based on this, they could formulate suitable business and 
technology strategies to match innovation-oriented learning and advance business 
scheme, technology and knowledge level. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future study 
 
7.1 Conclusion  
 
China has been experiencing an economic transition since 1978. At the current 
stage, many Chinese firms still focus too much on total cost advantage strategy after 
inducing manufacturing facilities. This causes severe competition among indigenous 
firms on the one hand, and affects development of innovation capacity on the other 
hand. To survive and develop in the era of globalization and “Knowledge Society”, it 
is critical and indispensable for Chinese enterprises to accumulate and create 
knowledge for core competence through effective organizational learning.  
In this thesis, two successful enterprises of Chinese public corporations in two 
different industries, consumer product manufacturing and logistics service, are 
observed. Even though the industry fields of these enterprises are quite different, there 
were found many similarities between two cases.   The case study mainly focuses on 
the paradigm-shift in the industries they belong to and how they learn knowledge 
outside and inside enterprise.  After careful examination and analysis, it is suggested 
that: 
1) Industrial paradigm-shift can be a good opportunity for Chinese 
enterprises to foster core competence, only if they change their 
organizational learning manner and knowledge management.  
2) To seize the opportunity of industrial paradigm-shift, firms’ organizational 
learning should be innovation-oriented. That means there should be a 
theme of innovation in firms’ organizational learning, such as innovation 
of business scheme in Case 1 and technology innovation in Case 2. 
3) To execute innovation-oriented learning, enterprises should utilize their 
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historical heritage and organizational culture by modifying to fit the new 
reality they are facing, as indicated in the cases. They should also carefully 
utilize the timing of changing the surrounding circumstance.  
4) Tacit knowledge management is critical for innovation-oriented learning. 
Because tacit knowledge cannot absorb through documentations like 
explicit knowledge, enterprises should change the human resources and 
reform their organizations to be suitable for absorbing, sharing, and 
crating tacit knowledge. In industry paradigm shift, whether enterprises 
can change their organizations or not is one of the most essential issues.   
In spite of some uniqueness of organizational learning manner in the two case 
enterprises, several important implications are essential for Chinese firms in their 
innovation-oriented learning and tacit knowledge management, because each 
enterprise in any industry should take account of tacit knowledge management for 
forming the core competence. The implications are summarized as follow: 
1) Tacit knowledge is the core of fostering enterprise’s core competence. In 
order to absorb tacit knowledge from outside and transfer it inside the 
organization, it is necessary for Chinese enterprises to open up personnel 
communication channels with the organizations concerned as many as 
possible. 
2) Innovative knowledge generates only when tacit knowledge inside 
individuals can effectively be transferred and transformed based on the 
circulation of explicit mode and tacit mode. Flexible organization forms, 
such as closely communicated teams with common vision, may be 
effective to match tacit knowledge transferring and transforming. 
3) The growth of knowledge base is a process of absorption, accumulation, 
and creation of knowledge by circulating explicit knowledge and tacit 
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knowledge, as Prof. Nonaka pointed out.   Whereas, when knowledge 
base upgrades to a higher level, strategy change and new knowledge 
sources are necessary to match higher level organizational learning.   A 
firm’s top leader must have a keen insight into the stage of the firm’s 
technology, business and knowledge base, and seize the right time to 
formulate suitable strategies. Top leader’s knowledge and experience is 
very important.  
4) Organizational learning and knowledge management are positively related 
to the stages of enterprises’ internal and external conditions. Industrial 
paradigm-shift urges Chinese enterprises to reconsider their organizational 
learning and to adjust their learning to an innovation-oriented style. That is, 
for example, good match of learning style to business status engenders 
effectiveness in enterprises’ organizational learning. In this sense, good 
timing of learning is very important. 
5) To establish a group learning platform, some historical heritages of 
Chinese enterprises, such as Youth League, Civilized Units, can be useful. 
To utilize such historical heritages would be one effective clue to realize 
innovation in Chinese society. But on the other hand, we have to be very 
careful to watch those historical culture’s limitation and shortage to 
advance. In any moment, the organizations should aim to be change to 
adopt the new coming reality of the market and the industry world.    
    These implications obtained through this research can be helpful not only for 
Chinese enterprises but also for many enterprises in many other countries, particularly 
when they are facing to a paradigm shift of the industries. 
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7.2 Future Study  
        
In this research, two cases of Chinese public companies are chosen and study. 
Their success in the industrial paradigm-shift provided several suggestive 
implications for Chinese enterprises. However, we know that two successful cases are 
not sufficient to illuminate the solutions to the problems Chinese enterprises 
encountered. On the other hands, at current stage, the two companies are successful, 
but it doesn’t mean they will always succeed on the basis of their unique 
organizational learning manner. Deeper and further examination and analysis of the 
cases are necessary. To illuminate effective organizational learning in Chinese 
economic transitions and industrial paradigm-shifts, much more cases from different 
industries and different forms of enterprise will be studied. We have been collecting 
large amounts of data and materials on this research issue. As for the next step, some 
Chinese private companies will be studied. A comparative study of public companies 
and private companies on the issue of organizational learning will also be conducted 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 Notes 
 
Note 1: According to China’s Company Law, “In the case of a joint stock limited 
company, its total capital shall be divided into equal shares, shareholders shall 
assume liability towards the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings, 
and the company shall be liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets (Article3, 
Chapter I of Company Law of the people’s Republic of China, 1999). A joint stock 
limited company in China’s Company Law is roughly equal to a public corporation in 
the U.S. (Liao Fan,) 
 
Note 2: “Market for Technology” policy is a set of measures to encourage and attract 
FDI by opening up its huge domestic market on a larger scale. The policy was 
officially launched in 1992. One of the primary motivations for China to implement 
“market for technology” policy and attract FDI was, and still is, to obtain advanced 
technology from developed countries and then base on this to establish domestic 
innovation capacities. 
 
Note 3: Youth League: The China Youth League (中国共产主义青年团) is a youth 
movement for youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. Most high school 
students are Youth League members when graduating. The movement of Youth 
League remains in many of Chinese enterprises, especially state-owned or former 
state-owned enterprises 
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Appendix 2 Laws and law-like administrative directives  
 
The Chinese administrative system has an elaborate hierarchic classification of 
the documents it produces. Apart from regular laws that usually take very long to pass 
and law-like administrative directives, there is a hierarchy of administrative 
documents. this hierarchy – in descending order of bindingness – is order (命令), 
instruction (指示), circular (通知) and opinion (意见). In the list above, the nature of 
the document and month of publication or taking effect can be found in brackets. 
 
1) 公司法 Company law, new version (law, took effect 1/2006) 
2) 公司法 Company law, old version (law, 1999) 
3) 反垄断法 Anti-monopoly law (law draft, under review) 
4) 中央企业投资监督管理暂行办法  
Central enterprises investment supervision and management (temporary directive, 
7/2006) 
5) 上海市国有资产收益收缴管理试行办法  
Trial directive on Shanghai city state assets revenue and dividend management (trial 
directive, 11/2005) 
6) 上市公司股权分置改革管理办法  
Directive on listed companies' share structure reform (directive, 2005) 
7) 上市公司收购管理办法  
Directive on the takeover of listed companies (directive, 9/2006) 
8) 地方国有资产监管工作指导监督暂行办法  
Temporary directive on the guidance and supervision of local state assets 
management work (temporary directive, 5/2006) 
9) 企业国有资产监督管理暂行条例  
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Interim regulations on the management of enterprise state-owned assets (regulation, 
5/2003) 
 
Other administrative regulations 
 
10) 国有资产监督管理委员会令  
State assets supervision and management committee (order, 4/2006) 
11) 国务院关于试行国有资本经营预算的意见  
State Council opinion on the trial State Assets Management Budget (opinion, not yet 
published) 
12) 外国投资者并购境内企业暂行规定  
Regulations on foreign mergers and acquisitions (temporary stipulation, 9/2006) 
13) 国务院关于机构设置的通知  
State Council circular on organizational set-up (circular, 3/2003) 
14) 关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见  
Guiding opinions on the share reform of listed enterprises (opinion, 8/2005) 
15) 关于上市公司股权分置改革中国有股股权管理有关问题的通知  
Circular on some issues related to the management of state-held shares in the reform 
of listed enterprises' non-tradable shares (circular, 9/2005) 
16) 行政单位国有资产管理暂行办法  
Provisional measures on the management of administrative organs' state assets 
(5/2006) 
17) 外国投资者并购境内企业暂行规定  
Provisional measures on mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign 
investors (temporary stipulation, 4/2003) 
18) 关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见  
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Guiding opinion on encouraging transformation and restructuring of the state-owned 
capital (opinion, 
12/2006) 
19) 关于企业国有产权转让有关事项的通知  
Circular on matters relating to the enterprises' transfers of state-assets (circular, 
12/2006) 
20) 外商投资产业指导目录  
Catalogue for the guidance of foreign investment industries (order, 11/2004) 
 
Policy papers 
 
21) 国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要 (草案)  
Guidelines for the 11th five-year plan (3/2006) 
22) 中国利用外资‘十一五'规划  
The 11th five-year plan for China's use of FDI (11/2006) 
23) 钢铁产业发展政策  
Steel industry policy (2005) 
24) 船舶工业中长期发展规划  
Shipping industry plan (2006; details not yet published) 
25) 国务院关于加快振兴装备制造业的若干意见  
Proposals for equipment manufacturing industry (6/2006) 
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Appendix 3 Major national science and technology programs 
 
Funding 
(100 million) 
Performing sector (%)  
Program 
 
Year 
started 
 
Focus and Objective 
Total  State  
share 
Univ RIs Firms 
Climbing 1992 Basic research 17.02 95.02 24.8 75.2 0 
“863” 1986 Catch-up with the West in selected 
areas of fundamental and frontier 
research 
1,004.21 52.05 29.8 35.6 28.7 
Key Projects 1982 Applied research and development to 
meet critical technological needs in key 
sectors of the economy 
2886.52 42.24 16.2 46.9 27.1 
Torch 1988 Commercialization of new 
technologies; entrepreneurship through 
incubators and science parks 
28993.04 1.77 0.7 3.0 95.3 
Spark 1986 Diffusion and adoption of technologies 
in rural China 
14752.67 4.14 0.2 4.5 87.9 
NNSF 1986 Basic and applied research 1004.01     
NKL 1984 Basic and applied research 950.12     
Extension 1990 Diffusion and adoption of new 
technologies 
4011.73 6.28 0.8 5.0 81.9 
Note:   
NNSF: National Natural Science Foundation      NKL: National Key Laboratories 
Univ: Universities                           RIs: Research Institutes 
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Appendix 4 A Schematic Description of Us-China Semiconductor Technology 
Gap 
 
Us-China Semiconductor Technology Gap
Source: Gao (2002)
 
